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Abstract
Domestic violence is a pervasive societal issue that hides from
no race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or socioeconomic status. Victims
of domestic violence deserve to have their stories told and heard and
to be protected from their abusers. However, protections go too far
sometimes. This Article argues that one protection that Illinois has
enacted into law — a statute that allows a prosecutor of a criminal
domestic battery case to obtain a domestic violence order of
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protection on behalf of the complaining witness under a civil
proceeding using the criminal complaint charging domestic battery
as the basis to obtain the domestic violence order of protection —
violates the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of the State of Illinois in multiple ways. Specifically, such a
framework interferes with the right of a criminal defendant to not
be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, the right of
a criminal defendant to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
the right of a criminal defendant to not be subject to penalty twice
for the same offense, and the right to due process. This Article also
demonstrates how the statute allows prosecutors to take advantage
of criminal defendants in domestic violence order of protection
proceedings in ways that are not necessarily unconstitutional.
Finally, this Article explores how the statutory framework makes it
unconstitutionally difficult for an indigent person subject to the
constraints of a domestic violence order of protection to appeal the
entry of the domestic violence order of protection and to challenge
this statutory framework itself. The Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois do not make
exceptions for defendants in criminal domestic battery cases. Just
as domestic violence victims need to be protected from their
abusers, criminal defendants charged with domestic battery must
be — and are constitutionally entitled to be — protected from an
abusive criminal justice process.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the law in the State of Illinois, a complaining witness in a
criminal domestic battery case may obtain a domestic violence order
of protection as a part of the criminal domestic battery case against
a criminal defendant.1 The law also allows the prosecutor of the
criminal domestic battery case to obtain the domestic violence order
of protection on behalf of a complaining witness in multiple
scenarios: First, if the complaining witness is unable to file the
petition for a domestic violence order of protection or, second, on
behalf of a minor or a dependent adult who is in the complaining

1. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-2.5(1) (2020); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/112A-4.5(a) (2020). The law also allows a complaining witness — and a
prosecutor on behalf of a complaining witness — in criminal cases to obtain a
civil no contact order in criminal cases involving sexual offenses and a stalking
no contact order in criminal cases involving stalking offenses. §§ 5/112A-2.5(2)(3); §§ 5/112A-4.5(b)-(c). This Article focuses on complaining witnesses and
prosecutors who obtain a domestic violence order of protection as part of a
criminal domestic battery case in Illinois. However, the analysis in this Article
is equally as applicable in criminal cases involving civil no contact orders in
cases charging sexual offenses and stalking in contact orders in criminal cases
charging stalking offenses in Illinois.

2021]

Using a Civil Designation as a Sword and a Shield

707

witness’s care if the complaining witness does not file a petition for
a domestic violence order of protection or asks that the prosecutor
file the petition.2 A prosecutor may file a petition for a domestic
violence order of protection and include in it the complaint from the
criminal case.3 Just like with any other order of protection, a
complaining witness — or a prosecutor — may first obtain an ex
parte domestic violence order of protection, but a criminal defendant
may ask for a hearing before a final domestic violence order of
protection is issued.4 The hearing for the final domestic violence
order of protection most often takes place in a criminal courtroom
in front of the same judge who is hearing the criminal case.5 Despite
the criminal complaint being used as the basis upon which to obtain
the domestic violence order of protection, the prosecutor of the
complaint that underlies the criminal case acting on behalf of the
complaining witness in attempting to obtain the domestic violence
order of protection, and the hearing for the final domestic violence
order of protection being heard in a criminal court room likely in
front of the very judge who presides over the criminal case, the
Illinois legislature has designated — for the most part — the
domestic violence order of protection proceedings as civil rather
than criminal.6
2. See id. § 5/112A-4.5(a)(2) (“A petition for a domestic violence order of
protection may be filed: by any person or by the State’s Attorney on behalf of a
named victim who is a minor child or an adult who has been abused by a family
or household member and who, because of age, health, disability, or
inaccessibility, cannot file the petition; by a State’s Attorney on behalf of any
minor child or dependent adult in the care of the named victim, if the named
victim does not file a petition or request the State’s Attorney file the petition.”).
3. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5(a)(1) (2020) (“[T]he court shall
grant the petition and enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie
evidence that a crime involving domestic violence . . . has been committed. The
following shall be considered prima facie evidence of the crime: An information,
complaint, indictment . . . charging a crime of domestic violence.”).
4. See id. §§ 112A-17.5(a)-(b), (g); id. § 5/112A-11.5(a-5) (“The respondent
may rebut prima facie evidence of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a
meritorious defense. The respondent shall file a written notice alleging a
meritorious defense which shall be verified and supported by affidavit. The
verified notice and affidavit shall set forth the evidence that will be presented
at a hearing.”).
5. See id. § 112A-5.5(f) (“The request for a final protective order can be
considered at any court proceeding in the . . . criminal case after service of the
petition.”).
6. See id. § 112A-6.1(a) (“Any proceedings to obtain . . . a protective order . .
. shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The Code of Civil
Procedure and Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to civil
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One of the purposes of the statute allowing complaining
witnesses and prosecutors to obtain a domestic violence order of
protection is to provide efficiency to complaining witnesses so they
do not have to attend separate and multiple court proceedings in
order to get an order of protection.7 This Article contends that, in
seeking such efficiency, the rights of criminal defendants in Illinois
charged with domestic battery as provided under the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois are
dangerously undermined and violated. The law in Illinois mandates
that the sections of the statute laying out the procedures for
obtaining a domestic violence order of protection are to be
interpreted in light of the constitutional rights of the complaining
witness.8 However, what about the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants, rights so important that they are included in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution of the United States and considered to be
basic tenets of the criminal justice system?9 The Illinois legislature’s
decision to designate domestic violence order of protection hearings
that are a part of a criminal proceeding as civil rather than criminal
allows prosecutors to use the statute and the civil designation as a
sword to obtain a domestic violence order of protection on behalf of
a complaining witness in a criminal case against a criminal
defendant.10 The statute and the civil designation also provide an
unacceptable shield to prosecutors that permits them to do things
or set things in motion that would otherwise violate the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.11 Such should in fact
be considered constitutional violations given the circumstances in
which domestic violence order of protections arise and that the
shield itself may ultimately serve as a sword to the prosecutor in
the criminal case.12 For the sake of justice and protecting the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants in domestic battery
proceedings shall apply, except as otherwise provided by law.”).
7. See id. § 112A-1.5 (“The purpose of this Article is to . . . minimize the
trauma and inconvenience associated with attending separate and multiple civil
court proceedings to obtain protective orders.”).
8. See id. (“This Article shall be interpreted in accordance with the
constitutional rights of crime victims set forth in Article I, Section 8.1 of the
Illinois Constitution.”).
9. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VIII (addressing the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the right not to be subject to penalty for
the same crime twice, the right against self-incrimination, and rights in a
criminal trial).
10. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-6.1(a) (2020) (“Any proceeding to
obtain, modify, re-open, or appeal a protective order and service of pleadings
and notices shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The
Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to
civil proceedings shall apply, except as otherwise provided by law.”).
11. See id.
12. People v. DeLeon, 2020 IL 124744 ¶ 9 (Ill. 2020) (noting that the
domestic violence order of protection statute operates in criminal proceedings).
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cases, the Illinois legislature — and the courts in Illinois — must
not permit prosecutors to hide behind the shield.13
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the relevant
portions of the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Illinois.14 Specifically, Part I focuses on
the right of a criminal defendant to have the prosecution prove the
charges against him or her beyond a reasonable doubt, the
presumption of innocence, the right of a criminal defendant to not
put on a defense or to not have to disprove the prosecution’s case,
the right of a criminal defendant to not be compelled to be a witness
against himself or herself, the right of a criminal defendant to not
be subject to prosecution more than once for the same crime, and
the right to due process. Part II then briefly discusses the crime of
domestic battery in Illinois before thoroughly exploring the statute
that allows complaining witnesses and prosecutors to obtain a
domestic violence order of protection against the criminal defendant
and the sections of the statute that discuss the procedure of
domestic violence order of protection hearings.15 Part III analyzes
how the statute allows prosecutors to violate the integral
constitutional rights the Constitution of the United States and
Constitution of the State of Illinois afford to criminal defendants
charged with domestic battery.16 Part III also touches upon how a
prosecutor can take advantage of a criminal defendant charged with
domestic battery in unfair but constitutional ways to meet the
prosecutor’s ends under the statute.17 Part IV briefly discusses how
the civil designation unconstitutionally prevents indigent criminal
defendants from appealing the entry of a final domestic violence
order of protection, exposing an issue of income inequality between
those who can afford to hire private counsel and those who cannot,
reducing the likelihood that the statutory framework itself is held
unconstitutional.18 This Article then offers a conclusion.

13. By no means is the purpose of this Article to rail against prosecutors. As
a critical part of the criminal justice system, they are simply doing their jobs
and what the law allows them to do. The problem lies with the legislature that
designated the domestic violence order of protection proceedings as civil,
allowing prosecutors to engage in actions that would ordinarily violate the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants charged with domestic battery.
14. Infra Part II.
15. Infra Part II.
16. Infra Part III.
17. Infra Part III.
18. Infra Part IV.
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II. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF ILLINOIS, AND THE ILLINOIS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
ORDER OF PROTECTION STATUTE
A defendant charged with a crime in Illinois enjoys several
important constitutional rights under the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois as he or
she makes his or her way through the criminal justice system.19
Additionally, a defendant charged with domestic battery in Illinois
may find himself or herself as a respondent in a petition for a
domestic violence order of protection.20 This Part examines some of
the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, briefly discusses
the crime of domestic battery in Illinois, and provides a
comprehensive walkthrough of Illinois’ domestic violence order of
protection statute.21

A. Relevant Provisions of the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois
and Other Rights of Criminal Defendants
The Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
State of Illinois enshrine certain protections for those charged with
crimes.22 Many of those rights come from the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States, including the right not to be
prosecuted for the same offense twice and the right not to be
compelled to be a witness against oneself.23 The Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois also
guarantee due process, and the Due Process Clauses of each
respective constitution gives constitutional protection to some of the

19. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VIII (addressing the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures the right not to be subject to penalty for the
same crime twice, the right against self-incrimination, and rights in a criminal
trial); ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-8, 9-10 (explaining the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the right to an indictment or a preliminary hearing, the
right against self-incrimination, the right not to be put in jeopardy for the same
offense twice, the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself, and
trial rights).
20. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-2.5(1) (2020) (“The following
protective orders may be entered in conjunction with . . . a criminal prosecution:
a domestic violence order of protection in cases of domestic violence[.]”).
21. Infra §§ I.A, I.B.
22. See supra note 19 and accompany text (sampling some of those
protections).
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing criminal defendants with the right
not to be subject to penalty twice for the same offense and not to be compelled
to be a witness against oneself).
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basic tenets of criminal law.24 Finally, criminal defendants in
Illinois who have been found guilty have a right to appeal their
cases.25 The judiciary makes the decision of whether a statute
violates any of these constitutional rights.26
1. The Prohibition on Double Jeopardy and the Right Not to
be Compelled to be a Witness Against Oneself
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States prohibits a criminal defendant
from being subject to potential penalty for the same crime twice.27
Even though this right applies to the State of Illinois through the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,28
the Constitution of the State of Illinois contains a similar clause.29
Jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn in.30 If a criminal
defendant has been found not guilty on charges, he or she may not
be retried for those same charges.31 The Double Jeopardy Clause is
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”); ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (holding that the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States requires that the
prosecution prove the defendant in a criminal case guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt).
25. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit
Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial District in
which the Circuit Court is located except in cases appealable directly to the
Supreme Court and except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case,
there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal.”).
26. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-80 (1803) (holding that laws
contrary to the Constitution of the United States are void, the judiciary
determines what the law says, the judicial power of federal courts extends to
cases that arise under the Constitution of the United States, and the
Constitution of the United States binds courts in making decisions).
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”).
28. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States).
29. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense.”).
30. See Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 840 (2014) (noting that jeopardy
attaches in a jury trial when the jury is sworn).
31. See Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352, 357 (2016)
(holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United
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not to be read literally; the intent of the Double Jeopardy Clause is
to prohibit a second punishment in judicial proceedings featuring
the same crime.32 Additionally, the Double Jeopardy Clause serves
two interests,33 one of which is to preserve the finality of
judgements.34 Finally, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the
prosecution from litigating an issue that a jury must have decided
in its determination to acquit a criminal defendant at trial.35
Furthermore, under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States, a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to be
a witness against himself or herself in a criminal case.36 Again, even
though the Clause applies to Illinois through the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,37 the
Constitution of the State of Illinois contains a similar provision.38
There are three elements to consider in determining whether the
Clause applies: compulsion, incrimination, and testimony.39
In terms of compulsion, a criminal defendant has the right to
remain silent unless he or she makes the choice, in exercising his or
her free will, to speak.40 The key test for compulsion is considering
whether the criminal defendant’s will was overborne.41 In essence,

States bars prosecution of the same defendant for the same offense after both a
conviction and an acquittal).
32. See Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 117 (2009) (“‘[I]t is very clearly
the spirit of the instrument to prevent a second punishment under judicial
proceedings for the same crime, so far as the common law gave that protection.’”
(quoting Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 170 (1873))).
33. See id. (positing that the Double Jeopardy Clause serves two interests).
34. See id. at 118 (holding that one of the interests is preserving final
judgments (quoting Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33, (1978))).
35. See id. at 119 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)) (holding
that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the prosecution is prohibited from
relitigating any issue that a jury necessarily decided when acquitting a
defendant in a prior trial).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.”).
37. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 (1965) (citing Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964)) (holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States applies to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
38. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person shall be compelled in a criminal
case to give evidence against himself.”).
39. See, e.g., Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 (explaining the element of compulsion);
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (discussing the element of
incrimination); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (exploring the
element of testimony).
40. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 (holding that the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, as applied through the Fourteenth
Amendment to the States, requires that a person has the right to remain silent,
to speak if he or she chooses, and not to be punished for choosing to remain
silent).
41. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (noting that the
primary inquiry is determining whether the accused had his or her will
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any statements made must be made freely and voluntarily without
inducement and knowingly and intelligently.42 The determination
of whether there is compulsion is made on a case-by-case basis.43
The guarantee applies to testimonial compulsion.44 Furthermore, a
prosecutor cannot call the defendant as a witness in a criminal case;
the prosecution cannot prove the allegations through coercion and
using a defendant’s own words or involuntarily call the defendant
to testify against himself or herself.45 Such is an important tenet of
overborne when confessing (quoting Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534
(1963))).
42. See id. (quoting Wilson v. United States, 168 U.S. 613, 623 (1896)
(explaining that whether a confession is admissible depends on whether the
confession was made without compulsion or inducement, voluntarily, and
freely); People v. Bernasco, 562 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1990) (requiring a knowing
and intelligent and voluntary waiver for an accused’s statements to be
admissible). The requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver and a
voluntary waiver are two separate inquiries. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
482-83 (1981). A waiver is knowing and intelligent depending on the specific
circumstances of a case, including an accused’s experiences, actions, and
background. Id. at 482 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938);
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)). It also requires
that the accused know the nature of the right he or she is giving up and the
potential consequences of his or her decision to give up the right. Bernasco, 562
N.E. at 962-63 (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 282 (1988). A waiver
of the right is voluntary depending on whether the waiver of the right was a
result of coercion, deception, or intimidation or a result of a deliberate choice.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
43. See id. (holding that the determination of whether the confession was
made as a result of coercion or improper inducement requires examining all
attendant circumstances).
44. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (explaining the Fifth Amendment’s SelfIncrimination Clause); B. Todd Jones, Know Your Rights; A Guide to the United
States
Constitution,
U.S.
ATTY’S
OFF.
DIST.
OF
MINN.,
10,
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-mn/legacy/2011/09/16/MN%
20Civil%20Rights%20FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/XP94-4NJ3] (last visited Aug. 25,
2020) (explaining that a person cannot be forced to testify against himself or
herself).
45. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (noting that the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States prohibits the prosecution
from calling the criminal defendant as a witness involuntarily); Malloy, 378
U.S. at 8 (requiring that the Constitution mandates that the prosecution
establish an accused’s guilt with evidence freely and independently secured
without coercively proving a charge against him or her with evidence spoken
from him or her); How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, AM. B. ASS’N (Sept. 9,
2019), www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_e
ducation_network/how_courts_work/defense/
[perma.cc/L8P9-F7GM]
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the Self-Incrimination Clause because if a prosecutor was able to
call a defendant as a witness at a criminal proceeding that occurs
before trial and elicits testimony regarding the alleged crime, such
testimony could be used against the defendant at a trial.46 It should
be generally noted that, when one takes the stand to testify, he or
she will have to answer the questions posed or be held in contempt
of court, and that a witness on the stand may claim the privilege.47
As for incrimination, when determining whether the Clause’s
protection applies, a court will consider when an answer to a
question itself would support a conviction or when the answer would
provide a link in the chain of evidence that is necessary to help
prosecute the person who claims the privilege.48 The presiding judge
determines whether claiming the privilege the Clause provides is
appropriate, considering whether, from the question’s implications
and the setting in which the question is asked, the answer to the
question could be dangerous as a disclosure may result.49
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,
through the protection against self-incrimination, does not allow the
prosecution to call the criminal defendant as a witness and explain his or her
story in a criminal proceeding); JONES, supra note 44, at 10 (declaring that the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States protects a person
from being forced to provide testimony against himself or herself).
46. See, e.g., ILL. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)-(2) (“A statement is not hearsay if [i]n a
criminal case, the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is inconsistent
with the declarant’s testimony at the trial or hearing, and—was made under
oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or narrates,
describes, or explains an event or condition of which the declarant had personal
knowledge, and the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the
declarant, or the declarant acknowledged under oath the making of the
statement either in the declarant’s testimony at the hearing or trial in which
the admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought or at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or the statement is proved to
have been accurately recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recording, or any
other similar electronic means of sound recording . . . . The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement, in either an individual or
a representative capacity.”).
47. See People v. Geiger, 978 N.E.2d 1061, 1062 (Ill. 2012) (noting that the
defendant was held in contempt for refusing to testify); Lefkowitz, 414 U.S at 78
(citing Kastigar v. United States, 407 U.S. 441 (1972)) (stating that a person
testifying and whom the privilege protects can permissible deny to answer
questions); Jason Meisner, Witness Held in Contempt for Refusing to Testify
Against Violent Hobos Gang, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 29, 2016), www.chicagotrib
une.com/news/breaking/ct-hobos-gang-trial-criminal-contempt-met-20161129story.html [perma.cc/6MX7-SR8L] (explaining that a person was found in
contempt of court and sentenced to a sixty-day jail sentence for refusing to
testify at a trial of gang members).
48. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (“[The privilege afforded not only extends
to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal
criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a . . . crime”).
49. See id. at 486-87 (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951))
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The element of testimony arises from the language “to be a
witness against himself.”50 Testimony is defined as “[e]vidence that
a competent witness under oath or affirmation gives at trial or in
an affidavit or deposition.”51 However, for one to be able to invoke
the privilege under the Clause, any statement made must be
testimonial or communicative.52 A statement is testimonial when
the communication itself discloses information or makes a factual
assertion.53
The Clause prohibits the prosecution in a criminal case from
commenting on the defendant’s choice not to testify, suggesting that
such choice not to testify is evidence of the defendant’s guilt, or
arguing or establishing that a negative inference is to be drawn
from a criminal defendant’s choice not to testify.54 To allow such
would penalize the criminal defendant for exercising a
constitutional right.55 The prohibition on commenting on or drawing
a negative inference from a criminal defendant’s refusal to testify is
important to protect the defendant’s right not to be compelled to be
a witness against himself or herself in a criminal case, as “[s]ilence
is often evidence of the most persuasive character.”56 Although the
(explaining that courts decide whether someone’s silence is justified and that,
for the privilege to be properly invoked, the implications of the question and the
circumstances and setting in which the question was asked must indicate
answering the question or explaining why it must not be answered is dangerous
with the potential for an injurious disclosure).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
761 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege only applies when a
witness is being compelled to testify against himself or herself or compelled to
give the State evidence that is “testimonial or communicative” in nature).
51. Testimony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
52. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege only applies when a witness is being compelled to testify against
himself or herself or compelled to give the State evidence that is “testimonial or
communicative” in nature).
53. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (holding that a statement
is testimonial if the communication “explicitly or implicitly relate[s] a factual
assertion or disclose[s] information”).
54. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965) (putting in no
uncertain terms that the prosecution or a court may not comment on a
defendant’s choice not to testify or infer that such is evidence of guilt).
55. See id. at 614 (indicating that allowing comment regarding a defendant’s
choice not to testify or permitting inference of guilt from such imposes a penalty
for invoking a constitutional privilege).
56. United States ex rel. Bilokumski v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself[.]”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person shall be
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Clause makes express reference to criminal cases, the Clause
applies in civil proceedings as well, and thus one can invoke the
clause in a civil proceeding.57 However, in civil proceedings, if a
witness invokes the Clause or chooses not to testify, it is permissible
to draw an adverse inference and use the witness’s silence or
invocation against him or her.58
2. The Guarantee of Due Process
Under the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Illinois, before a state may deny a
person of his or her life, liberty, or property, he or she is owed due
process of law.59 In Illinois, the right to due process requires that a
person have an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.”60 What process is due is determined on a
case-by-case basis.61
A key piece of the criminal justice system and due process is that
all criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven
guilty.62 Another vital piece is that, in order to overcome that
presumption, under the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, the
prosecution must prove the criminal defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt at a trial or the defendant must plead guilty so
compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself [.]”).
57. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination applies in civil proceedings and
that the application of the privilege does not depend upon the type of proceeding
in which the privilege is claimed); United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 672
(1998) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment Privielge against selfincrimination can be asserted at any type of proceeding when the witness
reasonably believes that his or her testimony could be used against him or her
in a later criminal proceeding).
58. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit a negative
inference against a party to a civil proceeding when refusing to testify).
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”); ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.”).
60. People v. Rucker, 127 N.E.3d 93, 96 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d. Dist 2018) (quoting
In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d 466, 484 (Ill. 2005)).
61. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)) (noting that due process is flexible and the
procedural protections to be put in place depend on the particular
circumstances); Rucker, 127 N.E.3d at 97 (quoting People ex rel. Birkett v.
Konetski, 233 Ill.2d 185, 201 (2009)) (explaining that due process is flexible and
different circumstances call for different procedures).
62. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (holding that the
presumption of innocence for those accused is “the undoubted law, axiomatic
and elementary” with the enforcement of such providing the foundation of
criminal law).
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that the innocent are not condemned and unjust loss of life, liberty,
or property does not occur.63 The criminal defendant is not required
to put on a defense or disprove the prosecution’s case.64
Presumptions can violate these basic tenets.65 Presumptions,
which, after certain facts have been established, allow the factfinder
to assume that a fact is in existence, are a permissible part of the
justice system.66 Presumptions can be mandatory, and they are
mandatory when the finder of fact is required to accept the
presumption.67 Mandatory presumptions can be broken down into
two types: conclusive and rebuttable.68 Conclusive mandatory
presumptions take the presumed element out of the case once the
State is able to establish the predicate facts and do not allow the
other party to rebut the connection that exists between the
presumed and proven facts.69 Mandatory conclusive presumptions
are unconstitutional given that they conflict with the presumption
of innocence and relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the
criminal defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.70 Meanwhile,
63. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64 (noting that, to be found guilty of
a crime, a person must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the
“reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure,” provides a foundation for the presumption of innocence, is
necessary to “command the respect and confidence of the community in
applications of the criminal law,” so that the criminal law not be weakened to
the point that the “standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned”); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
174 (1949) (holding that, in a criminal case, the accused must be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt to prevent unjust convictions that result in
“forfeitures of life, liberty, and property”). U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1
(explaining the right to due process from the federal government and the States,
respectively).
64. See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, supra note 45 (explaining that a
defendant can choose not to present evidence in his or her own defense,
believing that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof).
65. See, e.g., People v. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d 784, 788 (Ill. 2003) (holding
that all mandatory presumptions are per se unconstitutional in Illinois).
66. See id. at 787 (citing People v. Watts, 692 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 1998)
(explaining what a presumption is).
67. See id. (citing Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 320) (explaining what a mandatory
presumption is).
68. See id. at 787-88 (explaining the two types of mandatory presumptions);
Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 320 (explaining the two types of mandatory presumptions).
69. See Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 320 (explaining conclusory mandatory
presumptions).
70. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (explaining how a
mandatory conclusive presumption deprived a criminal defendant of his right
to have each element of the crime for which he was charged guilty beyond a
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rebuttable presumptions shift the burden of proof — either the
burden of production or the burden of persuasion — to the opposing
party.71 When the burden of production is shifted to the opposing
party, the finder of fact must find that a certain fact exists if the
opposing party does not offer evidence that rebuts that fact.72 If the
burden of persuasion is shifted, the fact finder must find the fact
unless the opposing party persuades the factfinder to not find the
fact.73 In a criminal case, a mandatory rebuttable presumption that
shifts the burden of persuasion from the prosecutor to the defendant
is unconstitutional, as such a burden shift relieves the state of its
duty to prove the criminal defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.74
In Illinois, mandatory rebuttable presumptions shifting the
burden of production are unconstitutional, too, making all
rebuttable presumptions unconstitutional in Illinois.75 In People v.
Watts, the Illinois Supreme Court found that shifting the burden of
production to the defendant in a criminal case is unconstitutional
because it requires the criminal defendant to present evidence in
order to overcome the presumption.76 If the defendant does not do
so, the judge would be required to give a directed verdict against the
defendant on the specific element for which the presumption was
used.77 Such would be unconstitutional, as a directed verdict cannot
be entered against a criminal defendant.78 Therefore, the court
reasonable doubt).
71. See Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 320 (explaining mandatory rebuttable
presumptions).
72. See id. at 320-21 (explaining mandatory rebuttable presumptions and
the burden of production).
73. See id. at 321 (citing Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 n.16 (1979))
(explaining mandatory rebuttable presumptions and the burden of persuasion).
74. See Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d at 788 (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524)
(noting that the Supreme Court of the United States has found mandatory
rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the criminal
defendant as per se unconstitutional because they then do not require the
prosecution to prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt); Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 321 (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524) (explaining
that the Supreme Court of the United States has found mandatory rebuttable
presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion as per se unconstitutional).
75. See Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d at 788 (citing Watts, 692 N.E.2d 315 at 32223) (explaining that, in Watts, mandatory rebuttable presumptions that shift
the burden of production from the prosecution to the defendant were deemed
unconstitutional, making all mandatory presumptions per se unconstitutional).
76. See Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 322-23 (holding mandatory rebuttable
presumptions that shift the burden of production to a criminal defendant
unconstitutional because shifting the burden of production requires the
criminal defendant to present evidence to overcome the presumption).
77. See id. at 323 (explaining that, if a criminal defendant fails to satisfy the
burden, in practice, the judge must enter a directed verdict against the
defendant on the element that the presumption proves).
78. See id. (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516 n.5; United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977)) (noting that such a result is
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concluded that mandatory production-shifting presumptions violate
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States and
the same Clause of the Constitution of the State of Illinois.79
3. A Person’s Appellate Rights in Illinois
The Constitution of the United States does not guarantee
someone a right to appeal.80 However, under the Constitution of the
State of Illinois, a criminal defendant has a right to an appeal
following a finding of guilt at a trial.81 In civil litigation, a person
has a right to appeal a final judgment, with a final judgment being
a court’s decision that terminates the litigation of the issue’s
merits.82
It is no secret that litigation can be an expensive endeavor,
especially for one who hires an attorney to litigate on his or her
behalf. There are certainly those in this country and in the State of
Illinois who cannot afford to hire an attorney. Meanwhile, the
government may be aiming the machinery of prosecution at
someone who is indigent, leaving that person vulnerable because
they do not have access to an attorney. That is exactly why indigent
criminal defendants are entitled to counsel under the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois.83
Similarly, the lack of the ability to appeal, namely for those who
contrary to the rule that it is unconstitutional to enter a directed verdict against
the accused in a criminal case).
79. See id. (holding that a mandatory presumption that shifts the burden of
production violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United
States and Due Process Clause of the State of Illinois).
80. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (citing McKane v. Durston,
153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894)) (noting that the Constitution of the United States
does not require States to provide appellate courts or the right to appeal).
81. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit
Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial District in
which the Circuit Court is located except in cases appealable directly to the
Supreme Court and except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case,
there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal.”).
82. Id.; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 301 (“Every final judgment of a circuit court in a civil
case is appealable as of right.”); Final-Judgment Rule, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ILL. CONST. art. I., § 8 (“In criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel[.]”). See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(requiring that indigent criminal defendants be provided trial counsel);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that a criminal defendant is
entitled to counsel if he or she is going to be imprisoned even for one day).
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cannot afford it, may raise certain due process concerns as well as
issues under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the
United States and Constitution of the State of Illinois, which
prohibits states from denying a person the equal protection of its
laws.84 In Griffin v. Illinois, the two criminal defendants were
convicted of armed robbery and filed a motion seeking a certified
copy of the record in the case for free for appellate purposes.85 In
their motion, the defendants stated that they were indigent and
thus were unable to pay the fees to acquire the record.86 Prior to this
case, in every criminal case in which a defendant sought a
transcript, outside of capital cases, the defendant was required to
purchase it.87 The defendants challenged this framework, stating
that it violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution of the United States.88 The Court noted that the
concepts of due process and equal protection require that, in
criminal cases, there be no discrimination between defendants;
everyone charged with a crime is equal before the bench in every
court.89 The Court held that a state cannot discriminate on the basis
of poverty just like it cannot discriminate on the basis of race or
religion and that one’s inability to pay cannot be used to deny
someone access to justice.90 The Court noted that a state that allows
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); ILL CONST. art.
I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.”); see generally Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that denying indigent criminal defendants
a free copy of court transcripts for appellate purposes violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United States).
85. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13 (explaining how the petitioners were convicted
of armed robbery after being tried together, thereafter filing a motion asking for
a certified copy of the record be provided for free).
86. See id. (noting how the petitioners alleged they were poor and could not
pay the fees to acquire the transcript and court records for appellate purposes).
87. See id. at 14 (explaining that those defendants who were indigent and
sentenced to death were given free transcripts, but, in all other cases where a
criminal defendant needed a transcript, he or she was required to purchase it,
indigent or not).
88. See id. at 14-15 (describing that the petitioners argued that the failure
to given them the transcript for free violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States).
89. See id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940))
(explaining that the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution of the United States require procedures in criminal trials that do
not discriminate between people and different types of people, with all
“stand[ing] on equality before the bar of justice in every American court”).
90. See id. at 17-18 (holding that it is just as impermissible for a court to
discriminate on the basis of poverty compared to religion, race, or color and that
the inability to pay cannot be used to deprive a criminal defendant of a fair
trial).
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appeals as of right cannot allow a system to be in effect that
discriminates against someone simply because he or she is indigent
given that appellate review has become an important part of the
justice system.91 “[T]here can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”92
Therefore, those who are indigent must be given the opportunity to
have the same and adequate appellate review process that someone
who is not indigent has.93
In Douglas v. California, the defendants were convicted of
thirteen felonies.94 The defendants sought assistance of counsel for
their appeal given that they were indigent, but their request was
denied.95 The Court noted that a California Rule of Criminal
Procedure provided that, when an indigent defendant seeks
appointed counsel for the purposes of the appeal, the appellate court
should make an investigation of the record to determine whether it
would be useful for the defendant to have counsel on appeal, appoint
counsel if it would be helpful, and deny appointment of counsel if
the appointment would not provide any value to the appellate court
or the indigent defendant.96 The Court found that denying counsel
91. See id. at 18 (citing Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Dowd v.
United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 208 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas, 316
U.S. 255, 257 (1942); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915); McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894)) (explaining that even though a State is
not constitutionally mandated to create appellate courts or provide a right to
appeal, when a state goes grant appellate review, it cannot discriminate against
a convicted a criminal defendant on the basis of his or her poverty, especially
when appellate review is an important part of the criminal just system in
Illinois).
92. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
93. See id. (requiring that indigent criminal defendants be afforded the same
appellate process as those who can afford to buy transcripts).
94. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 353-54 (1963) (stating how the
petitioners were together tried and convicted in California of thirteen felonies).
95. See id. at 354 (explaining how the appellate record reflected that the
petitioners asked for, and were denied, access to counsel on appeal despite being
indigent).
96. See id. at 355 (noting how the District Court of Appeal was acting
pursuant to the applicable criminal rules of procedures, which permitted
appellate courts in California, when an indigent defendant requests counsel, to
conduct an investigation of the applicable record and make a determination of
whether it would be to the defendant’s advantage or helpful to the appellate
court to appoint counsel and to appoint counsel after the investigation if the
appellate court decided it would be beneficial to the defendant or the court and
should deny counsel to the defendant if counsel would be of no value to the court
or to the defendant).
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to indigent defendants is the type of invidious discrimination on the
basis of poverty that Griffin v. Illinois prohibited.97 Again, “there
can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys
‘depends on the amount of money he has.’”98 The Court thus held
that an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to counsel when he
or she has the right to appeal.99 The Court reasoned that if a person
can afford counsel for appeal, such person will have the benefit of
the court determining the merits of the appeal after counsel has had
the opportunity to write and file briefs and make an oral argument,
whereas an indigent person would not benefit from such and the
appellate court would determine the merits of the appeal only on
the basis of what is in the record from the trial court, as he or she
does not have counsel as a result of not being able to afford
counsel.100 The Court noted that where there is hidden merit in the
appeal or the record is not clear, the indigent person has a
meaningless ritual while the one who can afford counsel has a
meaningful appeal.101 The Court stressed that when the merits of
an appeal for an indigent person who has the right to appeal are
determined without said person having the benefit of counsel, an
unconstitutional distinction exists between the wealthy and the
indigent.102
In Illinois, the State Appellate Defender’s Office is charged with
representing an indigent person when he or she seeks an appeal.103
97. See id. (holding that denying counsel to an indigent criminal defendant
on appeal would be equal to the invidious discrimination the Supreme Court of
the United States sought to combat in Griffin v. Illinois, where it was held that
a State could not grant and deny appellate review in a manner that
discriminates on the basis of poverty).
98. Id. (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19).
99. See id. at 357 (holding that, when the merits of an appeal are determined
without counsel, an unconstitutional distinction exists between the rich and the
poor).
100. See id. at 355-56 (noting how the practice at issue the type of appeal a
criminal defendant received depended on whether or not he or she could pay
counsel, and if he or she could the appellate court made a ruling on the merits
of the case after the benefit of a written brief and counsel’s oral argument, and
if he or she could not pay for counsel, the appellate court, under the practice, is
required to prejudge the merits of the case prior to it determining whether
counsel is to be provided, with only the barren record providing assistance to
the indigent at this point and forcing the indigent to go forward without counsel
unless the record shows a patent injustice).
101. See id. at 358 (theorizing that, when the record has no clear errors or
hidden errors, the indigent criminal defendant only “has the right to a
meaningful ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal”).
102. See id. at 357 (holding that when the merits of an indigent criminal
defendant’s appeal are decided without counsel,
an unconstitutional distinction exists between the rich and the poor).
103. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/3 (2020) (creating the State Appellate
Defender’s Office); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/10 (2020) (stating that the State
Appellate Defender’s Office is to represent the indigent on cases on appeal);
About Us, ST. APP. DEFENDER, www2.illinois.gov/osad/AboutUs/Pages/default
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However, the State Appellate Defender’s Office only represents the
indigent in criminal and delinquent minor appeals.104 Therefore,
they will not represent those seeking to challenge an entry of a final
domestic violence order of protection given that the domestic
violence order of protection statute deems such proceedings as civil
proceedings.105

B. The Framework of Illinois’ Domestic Violence Order
of Protection Statute
In Illinois, it is a crime to commit a domestic battery.106 There
are typically two ways domestic battery is charged in Illinois:
making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature and
causing bodily harm.107 The key distinction in Illinois between a
simple battery and a domestic battery is that a domestic battery is
committed against someone who is a family or household
member.108 For domestic battery purposes, a family or household
.aspx [perma.cc/752Y-6R79] (last visited July 5, 2020) (explaining that the
Office of the State Appellate Defender was created by statute and represents
indigent people on appeal when the Illinois Supreme Court, an appellate court,
or a circuit court appoints it to do so).
104. See § 105/3 (emphasis added) (“The State Appellate Defender shall
represent indigent persons on appeal in criminal and delinquent minor
proceedings[.]”); About Us, supra note 103 (noting that the Office of the State
Appellate Defender “represent[s] indigent persons on appeal in criminal cases”
(emphasis added)).
105. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-6.1(a) (2020) (“Any proceeding to
obtain, modify, re-open, or appeal a protective order and service of pleadings
and notices shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The
Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to
civil proceedings shall apply, except as otherwise provided by law.”).
106. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-3.2(a)-(b) (2020) (defining the crime of
domestic battery and the circumstances under which the crime of domestic
battery is classified as a Class A misdemeanor or a felony).
107. See § 5/12-3.2(a)(1)-(2) (“A person commits domestic battery if he or she
knowingly without legal justification by any means: causes bodily harm to any
family or household member; makes physical contact of an insulting or
provoking nature with any family or household member.”). A person can also be
charged with aggravated domestic battery if he or she, while committing a
domestic battery, causes great bodily harm or disability or disfigurement of a
permanent nature to the complaining witness or strangles the complaining
witness. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/12-3.3(a)-(a-5) (2020) (defining the crime
of aggravated domestic battery).
108. See § 5/12-3.2(a)(1)-(2) (including in the elements of domestic battery
“family or household member”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-3(a) (2020)
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member includes
[s]pouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren, and other
persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who
share or formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who have or
allegedly have a child in common, persons who share or allegedly
share a blood relationship through a child, persons who have or have
had a dating or engagement relationship, persons with disabilities
and their personal assistants, and caregivers . . . .109

The domestic violence order of protection statute defines a family
or household member the same way.110
Domestic battery can be charged as a Class A misdemeanor in
Illinois.111 When domestic battery is charged as a Class A
misdemeanor, it is punishable by up to one year in jail, up to two
years of probation, and a maximum fine of $2,500.112 If a criminal
defendant is found guilty of domestic battery, the court may also
order the defendant to undergo substance abuse treatment or
domestic violence counseling in addition to staying away from the
complaining witness.113 Additionally, a person convicted of domestic
(defining the offense of simple battery in Illinois, leaving out any mention of
“family or household member”).
109. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-0.1 (2020).
110. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-3(b)(3) (2020) (“‘Family or household
members’ includes spouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren, and
other persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who
share or formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who have or allegedly
have a child in common, persons who share or allegedly share a blood
relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a dating or
engagement relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal
assistants, and caregivers.”).
111. See § 5/12-3.2(b) (“Domestic Battery is a Class A Misdemeanor.”).
Domestic Battery can also be charged as a felony if certain circumstances are
present. See id. (listing all the circumstances that make Domestic Battery a
felony).
112. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT §§ 5/5-4.5-55(a), (d), (e) (2020) (listing the
maximum penalties for a Class A misdemeanor).
113. People v. Holman, 20 N.E.3d 450, 463 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d. Dist. 2014)
(noting that the defendant had previously been convicted of domestic battery
and was ordered to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and domestic
violence counseling); People v. Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d 844, 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d
Dist. 2000) (noting that the defendant was sentenced to complete domestic
violence counseling as part of a sentence for domestic battery); Abuse
Intervention Program, GRETCHEN S. VAPNAR COMMUNITY CRISIS CENT.,
www.crisiscenter.org/abuse-intervention.html [perma.cc/V8YF-PXNU] (last
visited July 7, 2020) (discussing how people who attend domestic violence
counseling may be court ordered to do so); Partner Abuse Prevention Program,
HEALTHCARE ALTERNATIVE SYS., www.hascares.org/program/partner-abuseprevention-program-paip/ [perma.cc/V9FR-RBDM] (last visited July 7, 2020);
Violence
Intervention
Services,
FAM.
COUNSELING
SERV.,
www.aurorafcs.org/counseling-services-in-aurora-illinois/violence-
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battery is not eligible to possess a firearm or ammunition.114
The domestic violence order of protection statute seeks to protect
anyone who has been abused by a family or household member and
any minor in the care of such a family or household member.115
Therefore, any person who a family or household member abused
can file a petition for a domestic violence order of protection.116 If a
criminal domestic battery case has arisen out of a family or
household member’s abuse, the person who files the petition for a
domestic violence order of protection may be — and likely is — the
complaining witness in the criminal case. A prosecutor of a criminal
domestic battery case may also file a petition for an order of
protection on behalf of a complaining witness who for one reason or
another cannot file the petition.117 A prosecutor can also file the
intervention-services/ [perma.cc/8GE3-3RQS] (last visited July 7, 2020); Illinois
Domestic Violence Laws, FINDLAW, www.statelaws.findlaw.com/illinoislaw/illinois-domestic-violence-laws.html [perma.cc/TN73-T7CB] (last updated
Mar. 21, 2018) (discussing how domestic violence counseling may be a part of a
sentence for domestic battery); Domestic Battery, L. OFF. DAVID OLSHANSKY,
www.domesticviolence.law/domestic-battery.html [perma.cc/7LJE-7CM3] (last
visited July 7, 2020) (stating how terms of a sentence for domestic battery
include domestic violence counseling and a stay away order from the
complaining witness); About Domestic Battery – What You Need to Know!, L.
OFF.
DAVID
LEE,
www.davidleelegal.com/practice-areas/criminaldefense/domestic-battery/ [perma.cc/C9CP-GJ52] (last visited July 7, 2020)
(explaining that a potential penalty for domestic battery is domestic violence
counseling and substance abuse counseling).
114. See § 5/12-3.2(d) (“Upon conviction of domestic battery, the court shall
advise the defendant orally or in writing, substantially as follows: ‘an individual
convicted of domestic battery may be subject to federal criminal penalties for
possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving any firearm or ammunition in
violation of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) and (9)).”).
115. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/112A-4(a)(1)-(2) (2020) (“The following
persons are protected by this Article in cases involving domestic violence: any
person abused by a family or household member [and] any minor child or
dependent adult in the care of such person[.]”). The statute also seeks to protect
“any person residing or employed at a private home or public shelter which is
housing an abused family or household member” in addition to others if a family
or household member of a child abuses them, including a foster parent of a child
if the child was put in a foster home by the Department of Children and Family
Services or a similar agency of another state, a guardian or custodian of a child
who is legally appointed, the parents of an adopted child, or a prospective
adoptive parent of a child so long as the child was placed in the home of the
prospective adoptive parent under statute. §§ 5/112A-4(a)(3)-(4).
116. See id. § 112A-4.5(a)(1) (listing who can file a petition for a domestic
violence order of protection).
117. See id. § 112A-4.5(a)(2) (listing who can file a petition for a domestic
violence order of protection).
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petition on behalf of a minor or dependent adult who is in the care
of a complaining witness of a criminal domestic battery case if the
complaining witness fails to file a petition himself or herself or asks
that the prosecutor file the petition.118 As a result, the domestic
violence order of protection statute allows domestic violence order
of protections to be issued as a part of a criminal prosecution for
domestic battery.119 In fact, the statute requires such when there is
a criminal domestic battery case ongoing and the petition for a
domestic violence order of protection names the complaining
witness.120 The petition is permitted to be filed once criminal
charges are brought but before the charge is dismissed, the
respondent, or the defendant in the criminal case, is acquitted, or
the respondent-defendant finishes serving his or her sentence.121
The petition can seek an ex parte domestic violence order of
protection, a final domestic violence order of protection, or both.122
The petition for the domestic violence order of protection must
allege — with an affidavit verifying or accompanying the petition —
that the respondent-defendant abused the petitioner, who is the
complaining witness in the criminal case, and that the respondentdefendant is a family or household member.123 If a final domestic
violence order of protection is sought, the request for such may be
considered at any court proceeding that is a part of the criminal
case,124 and the ex parte domestic violence order of protection will
remain in effect until hearing on petition for the final domestic

118. See id. § 112A-4.5(a)(3) (listing who can file a petition for a domestic
violence order of protection).
119. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-2.5(1) (2020) (“The following
protective orders may be entered in conjunction with . . . a criminal prosecution:
a domestic violence order of protection in cases of domestic violence[.]”).
120. See id. § 112A-5(a) (emphasis added) (“A petition for a protective order
shall be filed in conjunction with a . . . criminal prosecution . . . provided the
petition names a victim of the alleged crime.”). The domestic violence order of
protection statute includes a domestic violence order of protection in the
definition of “protective order.” See id. § 5/112A-3(a) (“’Protective order’ means
a domestic violence order of protection, a civil no contact order, or a stalking no
contact order.”).
121. See id. § 112A-5.5(a) (2020) (“A petition for a protective order may be
filed at any time after a criminal charge . . . is filed and before the charge . . . is
dismissed, the defendant . . . is acquitted, or the defendant . . . completes service
of his or her sentence.”).
122. See id. § 112A-5(a) (“The petition may include a request for an ex parte
protect order, a final protective order, or both.”); id. §§ 112A-17.5(a)-(b) (listing
the procedures for ex parte domestic violence orders of protection).
123. See id. § 112A-5(a)(1) (“The petition shall be in writing and verified or
accompanied by affidavit and shall alleged that[] petitioner has been abused by
respondent, who is a family or household member[.]”).
124. See id. § 112A-5.5(f) (“The request for a final protective order can be
considered at any court proceeding in the . . . criminal case after service of the
petition.”).
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violence order of protection.125
If the criminal domestic battery case is dismissed or the
respondent-defendant is found not guilty of domestic battery at the
criminal trial, neither the petitioner-complaining witness nor the
prosecutor, if the prosecutor filed the petition on behalf of the
complaining witness, is required to seek dismissal or vacation of the
domestic violence order of protection or the petition if the petition
has not yet been ruled upon.126 Instead, at the petitionercomplaining witness’s or prosecutor’s request, the petition or
domestic violence order of protection may proceed as an
independent action or be transferred to another court or division.127
The dismissal of a criminal domestic battery case also does not
affect the validity of a domestic violence order of protection that was
issued previously.128
In terms of procedure, the petition for a domestic violence order
of protection is to be an expedited proceeding.129 Additionally, the
court is not allowed to transfer or determine that it is not going to
decide parts of or the entire petition except pursuant to statute.130
If a court finds prima facie evidence that a crime of domestic battery
has occurred, it must grant the petition for the domestic violence
order of protection and enter the order of protection.131 The domestic
125. See id. § 112A-17.5(i) (“An ex parte order shall remain in effect until
the court considers the request for a final protective order after notice has been
served on the respondent or a default final protective order is entered,
whichever occurs first.”).
126. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-22.3(a) (2020) (“Voluntary dismissal
or withdrawal of any . . . criminal prosecution or a finding of not guilty shall not
require dismissal or vacation of the protective order[.])”.
127. See id. (“[A]t the request of the petitioner, petitioner’s counsel, or the
State’s Attorney on behalf of the petitioner, [the domestic violence order of
protection proceedings] may be treated as an independent action and, if
necessary and appropriate, transferred to a different court or division.”).
128. See id. (“Dismissal of any . . . criminal prosecution shall not affect the
validity of any previously issued protective order.”).
129. See id. § 112A-12(a-5) (2020) (“A petition for a domestic violence order
of protection shall be treated as an expedited proceeding.”); § 5/112A-17.5(a)
(“The petitioner may request expedited consideration of the petition for an ex
parte protective order. The court shall consider the request on an expedited
basis without requiring the respondent’s presence or requiring notice to the
respondent.”).
130. See id. § 112A-12(a-5) (“[N]o court shall transfer or otherwise decline to
decide all or part of the petition, except as otherwise provided in this Section.”).
131. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5(a) (2020) (emphasis added)
(“The court shall grant the petition and enter a protective order if the court finds
prima facie evidence that a crime involving domestic violence . . . has been
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violence order of protection statute specifically states that prima
facie evidence of the crime includes the information, complaint, or
indictment that charges domestic battery.132 Prima facie evidence
also includes a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt after a domestic
battery trial.133 This portion of the statute has been found
unconstitutional before as a violation of due process because it
allowed the entry of the final domestic violence order of protection
without giving the respondent-defendant an opportunity to be
heard.134 Therefore, the Illinois legislature amended the statute so
that once a prima facie showing of a crime of domestic violence has
been shown, the respondent-defendant can request a hearing and
challenge the potential entry of the final domestic violence order of
protection through introducing into evidence of what is called a
“meritorious defense,” allowing the respondent-defendant to rebut
the prima facie evidence of the crime.135 To even be allowed to
present evidence of a meritorious defense, however, the respondentdefendant must file a notice in writing with the court that alleges a
meritorious defense and that an affidavit supports and verifies.136
The notice must explain the evidence that would be introduced at
hearing.137 In practice, if the prosecutor who is prosecuting the
underlying criminal domestic battery case filed the petition for the
committed.”).
132. See id. § 112A-11.5(a)(1) (“The following shall be considered prima facie
evidence of the crime: an information, complaint, [or] indictment . . . charging a
crime of domestic violence.”).
133. See id. § 112A-11.5(a)(2) (“The following shall be considered prima facie
evidence of the crime: . . . a finding of guilt based upon a plea, or a finding of
guilt after a trial for a crime of domestic battery.”).
134. See id. § 112A-11.5 (Jan. 1, 2018), amended by § 5/112A-11.5 (June 29,
2018) (allowing the domestic violence order of protection to issue simply upon a
showing of prima facie evidence of a crime of domestic violence); People v.
Brzuskiewicz, No. 17CM2444 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 16th Cir. 2018) (finding the previous
procedure to obtain a domestic violence order of protection statute
unconstitutional). The legislature presumably amended the statute in response
to the finding in Brzuskiewicz.
135. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5(a-5) (“The respondent may
rebut prima facie evidence of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a
meritorious defense.”); § 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-17.5(g) (2020) (“[A]
respondent subject to an ex parte protective order may appear and petition the
court to re-hear the petition. Any petition to re-hear shall be verified and shall
allege the following: (1) that respondent did not receive prior notice of the initial
hearing in which the ex parte protective order was entered . . . ; and (2) that
respondent had a meritorious defense to the order or any of its remedies or that
the order or any of its remedies was not authorized under this Article. The
verified petition and affidavit shall set forth the evidence of the meritorious
defense that will be presented at a hearing.”).
136. See id. § 112A-11.5(a-5) (“The respondent shall file a written notice
alleging a meritorious defense which shall be verified and supported by
affidavit.”).
137. See id. (“The verified notice and affidavit shall set forth the evidence
that will be presented at a hearing.”).
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domestic violence order of protection, the prosecutor often conducts
the hearing on behalf of the petitioner-complaining witness, calling
witnesses — including the petitioner complaining witness himself
or herself if he or she chooses, as the prosecutor is not required to
call witnesses as he or she can simply meet his or her burden by
introducing the criminal complaint into evidence138 — and
examining them. The prosecutor will also cross-examine the
witnesses the respondent-defendant calls. Additionally, the
prosecutor often seeks to introduce the very same evidence he or she
would introduce at the respondent-defendant’s criminal domestic
battery trial, should the case reach trial. Finally, when the evidence
stage of the proceeding is closed, the prosecutor will argue that the
petition for the domestic violence order of protection be granted and
that the order of protection issues. Following the hearing, if the
court determines that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
respondent-defendant puts forth evidence establishing a
meritorious defense, the court may, but is not required to, choose to
not enter the domestic violence order of protection and may choose
to vacate the ex parte domestic violence order of protection or modify
its remedies.139 The judge who is presiding over the criminal case is
typically the judge who presides over the hearing for the domestic
violence order of protection, with said hearing occurring in the
criminal courtroom and the domestic violence order of protection
sought under the criminal case number.140
If a court enters the final domestic violence order of protection,
it may remain in effect for varying lengths of time.141 If the final
domestic violence order of protection is entered while the
138. Id. § 112A-11.5(a)(1) (“The court shall grant the petition and enter a
protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime involving
domestic violence . . . has been committed. The following shall be considered
prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint, [or] indictment . .
. charging a crime of domestic violence.”).
139. See § 112A-11.5(a-5) (emphasis added) (“If the court finds that the
evidence presented at the hearing establishes a meritorious defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide not to issue a protective
order.”); id. § 112A-17.5(g) (“If the court finds that the evidence presented at the
hearing on the petition establishes a meritorious defense by a preponderance of
the evidence, the court may decide to vacate the [ex parte] protective order or
modify the remedies.”).
140. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5.5(f) (2020) (“The request for
a final protective order can be considered at any court proceeding in the . . .
criminal case after service of the petition.”).
141. See id.§ 112A-20(b) (2020) (listing the varying lengths of time a
domestic violence order of protection may be in effect for).
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respondent-defendant is released from custody on bail for the
criminal domestic battery case, the domestic violence order of
protection will remain in effect until the criminal case is disposed of
or the criminal charges are withdrawn or dismissed.142 However, if
the criminal case is severed from the petition for the domestic
violence order of protection, the final domestic violence order of
protection may remain in effect for no more than two years.143
Otherwise, the final domestic violence order of protection may
remain in effect until the criminal domestic battery case is disposed
of or up to an additional two years if it is issued with a bond
forfeiture warrant; until two years after the respondent-defendant
completes his or her term of court supervision, conditional
discharge, probation, imprisonment, or parole as a part of the
criminal domestic battery case; or, until two years after a date the
court chooses for the expiration of the respondent-defendant’s
sentence for the criminal domestic battery case.144 In these cases,
however, the final domestic violence order of protection may be
extended multiple times, with the prosecutor of the criminal
domestic battery case himself or herself seeking the extension.145
There are many remedies that a petitioner-complaining witness
or prosecutor can seek in the petition for the domestic violence order
of protection.146 Specifically, the petition for the final domestic
violence order of protection can request — and the court can grant
— as remedies the prohibition of abuse of the petitionercomplaining witness and others not involved with the criminal case;
the grant of exclusive possession of the residence to the petitionerrespondent; that the respondent-defendant stay away from the
petitioner-complaining witness and others that the domestic
violence order of protection protects; that the respondent-defendant
stay away from the petitioner-complaining witness’s place of work,
school, or other specific locations; that the respondent-defendant
undergo counseling, including psychological, substance abuse or
alcohol abuse counseling, and domestic violence counseling; custody

142. See § 112A-20(b)(1) (“A final protective order shall remain in effect as
follows: if entered during pre-trial release, until disposition, withdrawal, or
dismissal of the underlying charge[.]”).
143. See id. (“[I]f, however, the case is continued as an independent cause of
action, the order’s duration may be for a fixed period of time not to exceed 2
years[.]”).
144. See id. §§ 112A-20(b)(2)-(4) (listing the varying length of time a
domestic violence order of protection may remain in effect).
145. See id. § 112A-20(e) (“Any domestic violence order of protection . . . that
expires 2 years after the expiration of the defendant’s sentence . . . may be
extended one or more times, as required. The petitioner, petitioner’s counsel, or
the State’s Attorney on the petitioner’s behalf shall file the motion for an
extension of the final protective order in the criminal case.”).
146. See id. 112A-14(b) (2020) (listing the numerous remedies that can be
included in a domestic violence order of protection).
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of any children to the petitioner-complaining witness; exclusive
possession of property or animals to the petitioner-complaining
witness; and that the respondent-defendant refrain from possessing
firearms.147
A domestic violence order of protection may also be modified.148
A complaining witness in a criminal domestic battery case or a
prosecutor on behalf of a complaining witness can seek modification
of the domestic violence order of protection.149 When a complaining
witness — or a prosecutor on behalf of the complaining witness —
seeks to have an existing domestic violence order of protection
modified, the court can add any remedy authorized in the remedies
section of the statute that was not requested to be a part of the
already-existing domestic violence order of protection or was denied
for procedural reasons but not on the merits.150 Once thirty days
have elapsed following the entry of the original domestic violence
order of protection, a court is only authorized to modify the order
when there are changes in the applicable facts that warrant
modification of the domestic violence order of protection.151
The domestic violence order of protection statute has the
laudable goal of seeking to protect those who are victims of domestic
violence and ensure the safety of their families in addition to
minimizing a victim of domestic violence’s inconvenience and
trauma of having to go to multiple and separate proceedings in
order to get an order of protection.152 The Illinois legislature has
147. See id. §§ 112A-14(b)(1)-(6), (8), (10)-(11.5), (14.5) (listing all of the
remedies that can be obtained as a part of a domestic violence order of
protection).
148. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-24 (2020) (discussing modification
of an existing domestic violence order of protection).
149. See id. § 112A-24(a) (“[U]pon motion by petitioner . . . or the State’s
Attorney on behalf of the petition, the court may modify a protective order[.]”).
150. See id. §§ 112A-24(a)(2)(ii)-(iii) (“[U]pon motion by the petitioner . . . or
the State’s Attorney on behalf of the petition, the court may modify a protective
order: by adding any remedy authorized by Section 112A-14 . . . which was: not
requested for inclusion in that protective order; or denied on procedural
grounds, but not on the merits.”). Section 112A-14 lists all the remedies
available when seeking a domestic violence order of protection.
151. See id. § 112A-24(c) (“After 30 days following the entry of a protective
order, a court may modify that order only when changes in the applicable law
or facts since that final order was entered warrant a modification of its terms.”).
152. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-1.5 (2020) (“The purpose of this
Article is to protect the safety of victims of domestic violence . . . and the safety
of their family and household members; and to minimize the trauma and
inconvenience associated with attending separate and multiple civil court
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determined that the domestic violence order of protection statute
must be interpreted in favor of a victim’s constitutional rights under
the Illinois Constitution.153 One such right of crime victims under
the Constitution of the State of Illinois is to be treated fairly and
with respect for their privacy and dignity and to not be intimidated,
harassed, and abused as the case moves through the criminal
justice system.154 Meanwhile, the Illinois legislature has also
designated domestic violence order of protection proceedings as
civil, save for a few exceptions.155 One such exception is that the
criminal law rules of discovery apply.156 Furthermore, it is
impermissible to obtain discovery as part of the domestic violence
order of protection proceedings that would not be able to be obtained
as part of the criminal proceedings.157 In the legal sense of turning
over evidence to the opposing party, discovery is defined as a
“compulsory disclosure, at a party’s request, of information that
relates to the litigation” or “[t]he facts or documents disclosed.”158
When it comes to interpreting statutes, the goal is to give the
meaning to the statute that the legislature intended.159 The
strongest evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the
statute.160 Language in the statute must be given its plain
meaning.161
In the end, the domestic violence order of protection statute,
along with the purposes of the statute, how the statute is to be

proceedings to obtain protective orders.”).
153. See id.; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (describing the rights of crime victims).
154. See ILL. CONST Art. I, § 8.1(a)(1) (“Crime victims, as defined by law,
shall have the following rights: The right to be treated with fairness and respect
for their dignity and privacy and to be free from harassment, intimidation, and
abuse throughout the criminal justice process.”).
155. See 725 ILL. COMP STAT. § 5/112A-6.1(a) (2020) (“Any proceeding to
obtain, modify, re-open, or appeal a protective order and service of pleadings
and notices shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The
Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to
civil proceedings shall apply, except as otherwise provided by law.”).
156. See id. § 112A-6.1(b) (“Criminal law on discovery . . . appl[ies] to
protective order proceedings under this article.”). Other exceptions include
venue and penalties for false statements. See id (explaining when criminal law
applies under the domestic violence order of protection statute).
157. See id. § 112A-6.1(c) (“Court proceedings related to the entry of a
protective order and the determination of remedies shall not be used to obtain
discovery that would not otherwise be available in a criminal prosecution.”).
158. Discovery, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
159. See Paris v. Feder, 688 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Ill. 1997) (citing Solich v.
George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Ctr. of Chicago, Inc., 630 N.E.2d 820,
822 (Ill. 1994)) (explaining that the cardinal rule when interpreting statute is
to determine the intent of the legislature and apply that intent).
160. See id. (noting that the strongest evidence of the legislature’s intent is
the language in the statute).
161. See id. (stating that a statute’s language must be given its “plain and
ordinary meaning”).
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interpreted, and the civil designation, create a perfect storm to
violate the constitutional rights of criminal defendants charged
with domestic battery in Illinois when prosecutors seek a domestic
violence order of protection on behalf of the complaining witness in
the criminal domestic battery case.

III. VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THOSE
CHARGED WITH DOMESTIC BATTERY IN OBTAINING THE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORDER OF PROTECTION
Despite the Illinois legislature designating the domestic violence
order of protection proceedings as civil, it truly is a criminal
proceeding.162 After all, the hearing for the final domestic violence
order of protection takes place in a criminal courtroom under the
criminal case number in front of the judge who presides over the
criminal case often with the State’s Attorney prosecuting the
criminal domestic battery case seeking to obtain the domestic
violence order of protection on behalf of the complaining witness in
the criminal case and presenting the same evidence in the same
manner he or she would present in order to obtain a finding of guilty
at a trial and examining witnesses he or opposing counsel may call
to the stand.163 In fact, the petition for the final domestic violence
order of protection is required to be filed as a part of the criminal
prosecution when the petition for the domestic violence order of
protection names the complaining witness in the criminal domestic
battery case as the petitioner.164 If it looks like a duck, swims like a
duck, and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck. With this premise
in mind, this Part explores how the domestic violence order of
protection statutory framework violates the Constitution of the

162. See § 5/112A-6.1(a) (“Any proceeding to obtain, modify, re-open, or
appeal a protective order and service of pleadings and notices shall be governed
by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The Code of Civil Procedure and
Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to civil proceedings shall apply,
except as otherwise provided by law.”); DeLeon, 2020 IL 124744 at ¶ 9 (noting
that the domestic violence order of protection statute operates in criminal
proceedings).
163. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5.5(f) (2018) (“The request for
a final protective order can be considered at any court proceeding in the . . .
criminal case after service of the petition.”).
164. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5(a) (2020) (“A petition for a
protective order shall be filed in conjunction with a . . . criminal prosecution . .
. provided the petition names a victim of the alleged crime.” (emphasis added)).
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United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois.

A. The Double Jeopardy Clause
The statutory scheme creates a loophole that allows prosecutors
to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois.165
Consider the following plausible scenario. A respondent-defendant
is on trial for domestic battery. The jury has been sworn in, so
jeopardy has attached.166 At trial, the prosecution calls the
complaining witness to testify and introduces the photos the police
officers took on the scene on the alleged date of incident and the 911
call the complaining witness made that the police responded to.167
In the middle of the trial, but before the jury returned a verdict, the
prosecution, as permissible under the statute, seeks to obtain a
domestic violence order of protection on behalf of the complaining
witness and files a petition for the domestic violence order of
protection and serves it upon the respondent-defendant.168 The
prosecutor seeks to have the domestic violence order of protection
be issued as part of a criminal prosecution for domestic battery.169
The prosecution includes in its petition for the domestic violence
order of protection the criminal complaint for domestic battery for
which the respondent-defendant is currently on trial; again, the
statutory scheme permits that practice.170 The court grants an ex
165. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life, liberty, or property[.]”); ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.”).
166. See Martinez, 572 U.S. at 840 (noting that jeopardy attaches in a jury
trial when the jury is sworn).
167. In Illinois, the introduction of a 911 call into evidence is permissible
under certain circumstances, but, for purposes of this Article, that is neither
here nor there. See generally People v. Dominguez, 888 N.E.2d 1205 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2d Dist. 2008); People v. Chmura, 930 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
2010).
168. See § 5/112A-5.5(a) (“A petition for a protective order may be filed at
any time after a criminal charge . . . is filed and before the charge . . . is
dismissed, the defendant . . . is acquitted, or the defendant . . . completes service
of his or her sentence.”).
169. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-2.5(1) (2020) (“The following
protective orders may be entered in conjunction with . . . a criminal prosecution:
a domestic violence order of protection in cases involving domestic violence[.]”);
§ 5/112A-5(a) (“A petition for a protective order shall be filed in conjunction with
a . . . criminal prosecution . . . provided the petition names a victim of the
alleged crime.” (emphasis added)). The domestic violence order of protection
statute includes a domestic violence order of protection in the definition of
“protective order.” See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-3 (2020) (“‘Protective
order’ means a domestic violence order of protection, a civil no contact order, or
a stalking no contact order.”).
170. See id. § 112A-11.5(a)(1) (2020) (“The following shall be considered

2021]

Using a Civil Designation as a Sword and a Shield

735

parte domestic violence order of protection at this time. At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury finds the respondent-defendant not
guilty of the domestic battery charges contained in the complaint
that the prosecutor seeks to use to obtain the domestic violence
order of protection. Before the court enters judgment on the finding
of not guilty, the prosecution seeks to request a final domestic
violence order of protection, which is permissible under the statute,
as the trial is still technically in progress and thus a court
proceeding that is a part of the criminal case is underway.171 Even
though the respondent-defendant was found not guilty of the
domestic battery charges, the prosecutor is not required to dismiss
or vacate the petition for the final domestic violence order of
protection, so the prosecutor chooses not to do so.172 Instead, the
prosecutor exercises his or her discretion in choosing to proceed with
the petition as an independent action and proceeds with the attempt
to obtain the domestic violence order of protection in the criminal
court.173 If successful, the final domestic violence order of protection
may remain in effect for up to two years.174 Meanwhile, the ex parte
order of protection previously entered remains in effect.175 The
respondent-defendant, pursuant to statute, exercises his or her
right to a hearing and files a meritorious defense, and the petition
for the domestic violence order of protection proceeds to hearing.176
prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint, [or] indictment . .
. charging a crime of domestic violence.”).
171. See id. § 112A-5.5(f) (“The request for a final protective order can be
considered at any court proceeding in the . . . criminal case after service of the
petition.”).
172. See id. § 112A-22.3(a) (2020) (“Voluntary dismissal or withdrawal of
any . . . criminal prosecution or a finding of not guilty shall not require dismissal
or vacation of the protective order[.]”).
173. See id. (“[A]t the request of the petitioner, petitioner’s counsel, or the
State’s Attorney on behalf of the petitioner, [the domestic violence order of
protection proceedings] may be treated as an independent action and, if
necessary and appropriate, transferred to a different court or division.”)
(emphasis added).
174. See § 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122A-20(b)(1) (2020) (“[I]f, however, the
case is continued as an independent cause of action, the order’s duration may
be for a fixed period of time not to exceed 2 years[.]”).
175. See id. § 112A-22.3(a) (“Dismissal of any . . . criminal prosecution shall
not affect the validity of any previously issued protective order.”).
176. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”); ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5(a-5) (2020) (“The
respondent may rebut prima facie evidence of the crime . . . by presenting
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At hearing, the prosecutor once again calls the complaining witness
to testify and introduces the photos the police took at the scene of
the alleged crime and the 911 call that the complaining witness
made. The judge grants the petition and issues a final domestic
violence order of protection. As for remedies, pursuant to the
statute, the judge orders that the respondent-defendant stay away
from the complaining witness and his or her place of work, the
petitioner-complaining witness is to have exclusive possession of the
residence, the respondent-defendant undergo substance abuse
treatment and domestic violence counseling, and the respondentdefendant cannot possess firearms.177
Such a scenario violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Constitution of the United States and the same Clause of the
Constitution of the State of Illinois.178 For one, it is
unconstitutionally providing a punishment in judicial proceedings
featuring the same crime, as remedies are being imposed after the
respondent-defendant was found not guilty of the crime of domestic
battery and the petition for the domestic violence order of protection
features the criminal complaint charging the domestic battery as a
basis to issue the order of protection.179 Furthermore, it violates one
of the interests of the Double Jeopardy Clause in preserving the
finality of judgments, as — despite the not guilty verdict — the
prosecution is seeking to obtain the final domestic violence order of
protection using the criminal complaint.180 Additionally, in
attempting to obtain the final domestic violence order of protection,
and in arguing for the petition for the final domestic violence order
of protection at the hearing, the prosecution is impermissibly
litigating issues that a jury decided in acquitting the respondent-

evidence of a meritorious defense.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-17.5(g)
(2020) (“[A] respondent subject to an ex parte protective order may appear and
petition the court to re-hear the petition. Any petition to re-hear shall be verified
and shall allege the following: (1) that respondent did not receive prior notice of
the initial hearing in which the ex parte protective order was entered . . . ; and
(2) that respondent had a meritorious defense to the order or any of its remedies
or that the order or any of its remedies was not authorized under this Article.
The verified petition and affidavit shall set forth the evidence of the meritorious
defense that will be presented at a hearing.”).
177. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-14(b) (2020) (listing the numerous
remedies that can be included in a domestic violence order of protection).
178. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life, liberty, or property[.]”); ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.”).
179. See Yeager, 557 U.S. at 117 (“[I]t is very clearly the spirit of the
instrument to prevent a second punishment under judicial proceedings for the
same crime, so far as the common law gave that protection.” (quoting Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. at 170)).
180. See id. at 118 (holding that one of the two interests the Double Jeopardy
Clause serves is to preserve final judgments (quoting Crist, 437 U.S. at 33)).
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defendant.181 Despite being found not guilty at trial of domestic
battery, the respondent-defendant is essentially impermissibly
facing retrial for the same charges, given that the criminal
complaint is attached to the petition for the domestic violence order
of protection; the proceedings are taking place in a criminal
courtroom under the criminal case number with the same judge who
presided over the criminal trial presiding over the petition for the
domestic violence order of protection; the prosecutor who prosecuted
the criminal domestic battery charge is seeking the domestic
violence order of protection on behalf of the complaining witness;
the prosecutor is presenting the same evidence in the same manner
he or she did at trial; the judge is essentially determining whether,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations in the criminal
complaint occurred; and the judge is imposing remedies he or she
could have imposed as a sentence had the respondent-defendant
been found guilty at trial, as the judge could have ordered the
respondent-defendant to have no contact with the complaining
witness, undergo substance abuse treatment and domestic violence
counseling, and not to possess firearms, had that occurred.182
181. See id. at 119 (citing Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443) (holding that, under the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the prosecution is prohibited from relitigating any
issue that a jury necessarily decided when acquitting a defendant in a prior
trial).
182. See Bravo-Fernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 357 (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United States bars prosecution of the
same defendant for the same offense after both a conviction and an acquittal);
Holman, 20 N.E.3d at 463 (noting that the defendant had previously been
convicted of domestic battery and was ordered to complete a drug and alcohol
evaluation and domestic violence counseling); Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d at 846
(noting that the defendant was sentenced to complete domestic violence
counseling as part of a sentence for domestic battery); DeLeon, 2020 IL 124744
at ¶ 9 (noting that the domestic violence order of protection statute operates in
criminal proceedings); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/112A-11.5(a)-(a-5) (2020) (“The
court shall grant the petition and enter a protective order if the court finds
prima facie evidence that a crime involving domestic violence . . . has been
committed. . . . The respondent may rebut prima facie evidence of the crime . . .
by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense. . . . If the court finds that the
evidence presented at the hearing establishes a meritorious defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide not to issue a protective
order. ”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT § 5/12-3.2(d) (“Upon conviction of domestic
battery, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing, substantially
as follows: ‘an individual convicted of domestic battery may be subject to federal
criminal penalties for possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving any
firearm or ammunition in violation of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (18
U.S.C. 922(g)(8) and (9)).”); § 5/112A-14(b) (listing the numerous remedies that
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B. The Self-Incrimination Clause
The statutory framework also violates a criminal defendant’s
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself
under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
the State of Illinois.183 Consider the following scenario: A prosecutor
files a petition for a domestic violence order of protection on behalf
of the complaining witness in the criminal domestic battery case.184
The prosecutor seeks to have the domestic violence order of
protection be issued as part of a criminal prosecution for domestic
battery, as he or she is required to do so.185 The prosecutor has
attached the criminal complaint to the petition to help in meeting
its burden and shifting it to the respondent-defendant.186 The
respondent-defendant files a notice in writing with the court
alleging a meritorious defense that an affidavit supports and
verifies and explains the evidence that would be introduced at a
hearing.187 At the domestic violence order of protection hearing, the

can be included in a domestic violence order of protection); Abuse Intervention
Program, supra note 113 (discussing how people who attend domestic violence
counseling may be court ordered to do so); Partner Abuse Prevention Program,
supra note 113; Violence Intervention Services, supra note 113; Illinois Domestic
Violence Laws, supra note 113 (discussing how domestic violence counseling
may be a part of a sentence for domestic battery); Domestic Battery, supra note
113 (stating how terms of a sentence for domestic battery include domestic
violence counseling and a stay away order from the complaining witness); About
Domestic Battery – What You Need to Know!, supra note 113 (explaining that a
potential penalty for domestic battery is domestic violence counseling and
substance abuse counseling).
183. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”); ILL. CONST. ART. I, § 10 (“No person
shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself.”).
184. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-4.5(a)(2) (2020) (listing who can file
a petition for a domestic violence order of protection).
185. See id. § 112A-2.5(1) (“The following protective orders may be entered
in conjunction with . . . a criminal prosecution: a domestic violence order of
protection in cases involving domestic violence[.]”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/112A-5(a) (2020) (emphasis added) (“A petition for a protective order shall be
filed in conjunction with a . . . criminal prosecution . . . provided the petition
names a victim of the alleged crime.”).
186. See id. § 112A-11.5(a)(1) (“The court shall grant the petition and enter
a protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime involving
domestic violence . . . has been committed. The following shall be considered
prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint, [or] indictment . .
. charging a crime of domestic violence.”).
187. See id. § 112A-11.5(a-5) (“The respondent may rebut prima facie
evidence of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense.”); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-17.5(g) (2020) (“[A] respondent subject to an ex parte
protective order may appear and petition the court to re-hear the petition. Any
petition to re-hear shall be verified and shall allege the following: (1) that
respondent did not receive prior notice of the initial hearing in which the ex
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prosecution calls the respondent-defendant as a witness to testify
as to the allegations in the complaint, even though the respondentdefendant had no plans of testifying — even when trying to prove
his or her meritorious defense. Such would be permissible because
the statute claims the proceedings are civil.188 However, this meets
the coercion element of the Self-Incrimination Clause because the
scenario describes events that amount to the prosecution trying to
prove the allegations in the criminal complaint through compulsion
and using the respondent-defendant’s own words; the respondentdefendant is being involuntarily called to testify by the prosecution
against himself or herself in what otherwise should be considered a
criminal proceeding for reasons previously discussed.189 Therefore,
simply calling the respondent-defendant is impermissible in the
proceeding in and of itself.190 Even so, compulsion would apply if the
respondent-defendant did not wish to testify, as with the prosecutor
parte protective order was entered . . . ; and (2) that respondent had a
meritorious defense to the order or any of its remedies or that the order or any
of its remedies was not authorized under this Article. The verified petition and
affidavit shall set forth the evidence of the meritorious defense that will be
presented at a hearing.”).
188. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-6.1(a) (2020) (“Any proceeding to
obtain, modify, re-open, or appeal a protective order and service of pleadings
and notices shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The
Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to
civil proceedings shall apply, except as otherwise provided by law.”); How Courts
Work: Steps in a Trial, supra note 45 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States, through the protection against selfincrimination, does not allow the prosecution to call the criminal defendant as
a witness and explain his or her story in a criminal proceeding).
189. Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 77 (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prevents the prosecution from calling a criminal defendant involuntarily as a
witness against himself); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8; Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486
(explaining the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause and testimonial
compulsion); How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, supra note 45; Jones, supra
note 44, at 10 (declaring that the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States protects a person from being forced to provide testimony against
himself or herself).
190. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 (requiring that the Constitution mandates
that the prosecution establish an accused’s guilt with evidence freely and
independently secured without coercively proving a charge against him or her
with evidence spoken from him or her); Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 77 (stating that
the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the prosecution from calling a criminal
defendant involuntarily as a witness against himself); How Courts Work: Steps
in a Trial, supra note 45 (noting that the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States prohibits the prosecution from calling the criminal
defendant as a witness involuntarily in a criminal proceeding).
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calling the respondent-defendant as a witness, the respondentdefendant would not be exercising his or her free will to speak, his
or her will will be overborne, and he or she will not be making
statements freely and voluntarily when testifying because he or she
will have to answer questions posed or be held in contempt of
court.191 It amounts to impermissible testimonial compulsion.192
In this scenario, the incrimination element is also likely to be
established. At the hearing, the prosecutor seeks to ask questions of
the respondent-defendant regarding the criminal complaint, and
therefore the court will likely determine that the answer to those
questions could support a conviction or provide a link in the chain
of evidence that would be necessary to help prosecute the
respondent-defendant.193 Furthermore, given the implications of
the question and the setting in which it is asked, the answer to
questions regarding the allegations in the criminal complaint are
likely to be dangerous.194 The testimonial element is also likely to
be present because, in answering the questions regarding the
allegations in the criminal complaint the prosecutor asks, the
statement the respondent-defendant makes on the stand is likely to
disclose information or make a factual assertion.195
191. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 (holding that the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, as applied through the Fourteenth
Amendment to the States, requires that a person has the right to remain silent,
to speak if he or she chooses, and not to be punished for choosing to remain
silent); Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513 (noting that the primary inquiry is determining
whether the accused had his or her will overborne when confessing and whether
a confession is admissible depends on whether the confession was made without
compulsion or inducement, voluntarily, and freely (quoting Lynumn, 372 U.S.
at 534; Wilson, 168 U.S. at 623)); Geiger, 978 N.E.2d at 1062 (noting that the
defendant was held in contempt for refusing to testify); Meisner, supra note 47
(explaining that a person was found in contempt of court and sentenced to a
sixty-day jail sentence for refusing to testify at a trial of gang members).
192. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (explaining the Fifth Amendment’s SelfIncrimination Clause); see also Jones, supra note 44, at 10 (explaining that a
person cannot be forced to testify against himself or herself).
193. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (“The privilege afforded not only extends to
answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal
statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a . . . crime”).
194. See id at 486-87. (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951))
(explaining that courts decide whether someone’s silence is justified and that,
for the privilege to be properly invoked, the implications of the question and the
circumstances and setting in which the question was asked must indicate
answering the question or explaining why it must not be answered is dangerous
with the potential for an injurious disclosure).
195. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege only applies when a witness is being compelled to testify against
himself or herself or compelled to give the State evidence that is “testimonial or
communicative” in nature); Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 (holding that a statement is
testimonial if the communication “explicitly or implicitly relate[s] a factual
assertion or disclose[s] information”).
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Given that there is compulsion, incrimination, and testimony in
this example, the respondent-defendant would be able to invoke the
Self-Incrimination Clause.196 The respondent-defendant would be
able to invoke the privilege even though the statute considers the
domestic violence order of protection proceedings as civil.197 Where
the issue comes in, however, is that, if the respondent-defendant
chooses to invoke the privilege, because the statute considers the
proceedings as civil, the prosecutor can argue to the judge to draw
an adverse inference and use the respondent-defendant’s invocation
of the Self-Incrimination Clause’s privilege against him or her to
obtain the domestic violence order of protection.198 Such would be
impermissible in criminal proceedings.199 Again, for reasons already
discussed, the domestic violence order of protection proceedings are
in practice criminal proceedings, and thus the prosecutor would be
violating the respondent-defendant’s constitutional right if the
prosecutor were to comment on the respondent-defendant’s
invocation of the privilege that the Self-Incrimination Clause
provides or seeks the negative inference in obtaining the domestic
violence order of protection.200
Ironically, the adverse inference in and of itself could serve as a
basis for compulsion. For example, a respondent-defendant may
recognize that if he or she invokes his or her right under the Clause
if the prosecutor calls him or her to testify at the domestic violence
order of protection hearing about the underlying allegations in the
196. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person shall
be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself.”).
197. See Arndstein, 266 U.S. at 40 (holding that the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination applies in civil proceedings and that the application
of the privilege does not depend upon the type of proceeding in which the
privilege is claimed); Balsys, 524 U.S. at 672 (explaining that the Fifth
Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted at any type of
proceeding when the witness reasonably believes that his or her testimony could
be used against him or her in a later criminal proceeding).
198. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316 (holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit a negative inference
against a party to a civil proceeding when refusing to testify).
199. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965) (putting in no
uncertain terms that the prosecution or a court may not comment on a
defendant’s choice not to testify or infer that such is evidence of guilt).
200. See id. (putting in no uncertain terms that the prosecution or a court
may not comment on a defendant’s choice not to testify or infer that such is
evidence of guilt); DeLeon, 2020 IL 124744 at ¶ 9 (noting that the domestic
violence order of protection statute operates in criminal proceedings).
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criminal complaint that is a part of the petition for the domestic
violence order of protection,201 the prosecutor may seek the negative
inference given the civil designation in the domestic violence order
of protection statute.202 Not wanting to have the adverse interest
used against him or her, the respondent-defendant may feel there
is no choice but to testify. This would amount to compulsion to
testify, as the looming possibility of the adverse inference would
induce the respondent-defendant to testify, overbearing his or her
will.203 Again, the incrimination and testimony elements would be
present because the prosecutor looks to ask questions of the
respondent-defendant about the criminal complaint, ensuring that
the answers to the questions could support a later conviction for
domestic battery or provide a link in the chain of evidence that
would be necessary to prosecute the respondent-defendant, and
answering the questions would disclose information or make factual
assertions.204 Given that there is compulsion, incrimination, and
testimony, the respondent-defendant can invoke the Clause’s
privilege.205 However, the respondent-defendant wants to avoid the
negative inference, and the prosecution may argue for it if the

201. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5(a)(1) (2020) (“The court shall
grant the petition and enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie
evidence that a crime involving domestic violence . . . has been committed. The
following shall be considered prima facie evidence of the crime: an information,
complaint, [or] indictment . . . charging a crime of domestic violence”).
202. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316 (holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit a negative inference
against a party to a civil proceeding when refusing to testify); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 5/112A-6.1(a) (2020) (“Any proceeding to obtain, modify, re-open, or
appeal a protective order and service of pleadings and notices shall be governed
by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The Code of Civil Procedure and
Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to civil proceedings shall apply,
except as otherwise provided by law.”).
203. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8; Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513 (noting that the primary
inquiry is determining whether the accused had his or her will overborne when
confessing and whether a confession is admissible depends on whether the
confession was made without compulsion or inducement, voluntarily, and freely
(quoting Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534; Wilson, 168 U.S. at 623)).
204. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (“The privilege afforded not only extends
to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal
criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a . . . crime”); Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 761 (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege only applies
when a witness is being compelled to testify against himself or herself or
compelled to give the State evidence that is “testimonial or communicative” in
nature); Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 (holding that a statement is testimonial if the
communication “explicitly or implicitly relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s]
information”).
205. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.”); See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person
shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself.”).
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respondent-defendant invokes the privilege.206 So, the respondentdefendant again feels compelled to testify, and the analysis recycles.
At the end of the day, the respondent-defendant may end up
testifying simply to avoid the negative inference, completely
reading out of the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Illinois the privilege the respective
Clauses of each creates.
Therefore, regardless of whether the domestic violence order of
protection proceeding is criminal or civil, it should be impermissible
to hold the invocation of the Clause against the respondentdefendant in domestic violence order of protection proceedings.
Such should especially be the case given that “[s]ilence is often of
the most persuasive character,” and that is why it is impermissible
for a prosecutor to argue that a court or a jury draw negative
inferences from a refusal to testify in criminal proceedings in the
first place; it would deprive the Self-Incrimination Clause of
meaning if one were able to draw a negative inference from an
invocation of the Clause in criminal proceedings, and the same can
be said if one invokes the clause in a domestic violence order of
protection hearing no matter whether it is considered a civil or
criminal proceeding.207 A negative inference against the
respondent-defendant in the domestic violence order of protection
hearing for invoking the protections of the Self-Incrimination
Clause amounts to an impermissible penalty against the
respondent-defendant for exercising his or her right under the
Clause.208 Given that the Self-Incrimination Clause has been
extended to apply to civil proceedings, the rule that one cannot use
an adverse inference against someone in a criminal proceeding for
206. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316 (holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit a negative inference
against a party to a civil proceeding when refusing to testify); § 5/112A-6.1(a)
(“Any proceeding to obtain, modify, re-open, or appeal a protective order and
service of pleadings and notices shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure
of this State. The Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court and local court
rules applicable to civil proceedings shall apply, except as otherwise provided
by law.”).
207. Bilokumski, 263 U.S. at 153-54. The same can be said for invoking the
protection in any criminal or civil proceeding.
208. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. at 614 (putting in no uncertain terms
that the prosecution or a court may not comment on a defendant’s choice not to
testify or infer that such is evidence of guilt). Again, the same can be said for
invoking the protection of the Clause in any criminal or civil proceeding. At the
end of the day, the negative inference should be held unconstitutional in both
criminal and civil proceedings.
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invoking should also be extended to civil proceedings to ensure that
the Clause is not deprived of its meaning and to avoid impermissible
penalties for invoking the clause, especially in domestic violence
order of protection hearings, where a criminal complaint is being
used as a part of a civil proceeding with the very prosecutor
prosecuting the criminal domestic battery case seeking to ask a
respondent-defendant questions about the allegations in the
criminal complaint charging the domestic battery in front of the
very judge presiding over the criminal domestic battery case in a
criminal court room and the prosecutor would not be permitted to
argue to the court to draw a negative inference under any other
circumstances given that all other proceedings related to the
criminal complaint charging domestic battery in which the
prosecutor participates are or would likely be considered criminal
proceedings.209
Furthermore, the prosecutor can use that he or she can obtain
an adverse inference against the respondent-defendant if the
respondent-defendant invokes his or her privilege under the Clause
in combination with other portions of the domestic violence order of
protection statute to obtain an unfair advantage at either the
domestic violence order of protection hearing or in the criminal
domestic battery case.210 It would essentially corner the respondentdefendant to make a losing choice in a lose-lose situation. For
example, the prosecutor can admit the criminal complaint that
charges domestic battery into evidence to meet his or her burden211
209. See id. (putting in no uncertain terms that the prosecution or a court
may not comment on a defendant’s choice not to testify or infer that such is
evidence of guilt); Arndstein, 266 U.S. at 40 (holding that the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination applies in civil proceedings and that the
application of the privilege does not depend upon the type of proceeding in which
the privilege is claimed); Balsys, 524 U.S. at 672 (explaining that the Fifth
Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted at any type of
proceeding when the witness reasonably believes that his or her testimony could
be used against him or her in a later criminal proceeding); DeLeon, 2020 IL
124744 at ¶ 9 (noting that the domestic violence order of protection statute
operates in criminal proceedings); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5(a) (2020) (“A
petition for a protective order shall be filed in conjunction with a . . . criminal
prosecution . . . provided the petition names a victim of the alleged crime.”
(emphasis added)); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5.5(f) (2020) (“The request for
a final protective order can be considered at any court proceeding in
the . . . criminal case after service of the petition.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/112A-11.5(a)(1) (2020) (“The court shall grant the petition and enter a
protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime involving
domestic violence . . . has been committed. The following shall be considered
prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint, [or] indictment . .
. charging a crime of domestic violence.”).
210. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316 (holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit a negative inference
against a party to a civil proceeding when refusing to testify).
211. § 5/112A-11.5(a)(1) (“The court shall grant the petition and enter a
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but may also choose to call the respondent-defendant as a witness
simply because the prosecutor knows that if the respondentdefendant invokes his or her right under the Clause, the prosecutor
can argue for the adverse interest and have the judge use the
respondent-defendant’s failure to testify about the allegations in the
criminal complaint against him or her and therefore help the
prosecutor in obtaining the final domestic violence order of
protection.212 But, in the alternative, the prosecutor knows that, if
the respondent-defendant testifies and does not invoke his or her
right under the Clause, the prosecutor may obtain testimony that
can potentially be used against the respondent-defendant at a trial
on the underlying charge for domestic battery.213 For example, the
prosecutor may file the petition for the domestic violence order of
protection on behalf of the complaining witness at the outset of the
case, well before discovery is complete on the criminal domestic
battery case.214 Given that the hearing for a domestic violence order
of protection is to be an expedited proceeding, the hearing on the
petition may also occur well before discovery on the criminal

protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime involving
domestic violence . . . has been committed. The following shall be considered
prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint, [or] indictment . .
. charging a crime of domestic violence.”).
212. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316 (holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit a negative inference
against a party to a civil proceeding when refusing to testify).
213. See, e.g., ILL. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)-(2) (“A statement is not hearsay if [i]n
a criminal case, the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is inconsistent
with the declarant’s testimony at the trial or hearing, and — was made under
oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or narrates,
describes, or explains an event or condition of which the declarant had personal
knowledge, and the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the
declarant, or the declarant acknowledged under oath the making of the
statement either in the declarant’s testimony at the hearing or trial in which
the admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought or at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or the statement is proved to
have been accurately recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recording, or any
other similar electronic means of sound recording . . . . The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement, in either an individual or
a representative capacity.”).
214. See § 725/112A-5.5(a) (“A petition for a protective order may be filed at
any time after a criminal charge . . . is filed and before the charge . . . is
dismissed, the defendant . . . is acquitted, or the defendant . . . completes service
of his or her sentence.”).
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domestic battery charge is complete.215 If the respondent-defendant
chooses to testify at the domestic violence order of protection
hearing with discovery incomplete to avoid the adverse inference,
the respondent-defendant may corner himself or herself into a
defense that later discovery may indicate is not a viable defense,
and if the respondent-defendant chooses to proceed at trial on a
separate defense that the discovery obtained after the domestic
violence order of protection hearing indicates is viable, the
prosecutor will be able to impeach the respondent-defendant should
he or she choose to testify at trial and he or she testifies
inconsistently compared to the testimony he or she gave at the
domestic violence order of protection hearing given the new defense
or otherwise undermine the new defense based on the respondentdefendant’s testimony at the domestic violence order of protection
hearing.216 In essence, the choice to testify at the domestic violence
order of protection hearing could be particularly and irreparably
damaging to the respondent-defendant in the underlying criminal
domestic battery case, and at that point, the respondent-defendant
will be facing up to one year in jail, two years of probation, and a
$2,500 fine as a potential penalty.217
Some may argue that the three previously analyzed scenarios
cannot possibly occur given that the domestic violence order of
protection statute states that it is impermissible to obtain discovery
as part of the domestic violence order of protection proceedings that
would not be able to be obtained as part of the criminal proceedings
and that criminal rules of discovery apply,218 so a prosecutor cannot
call a respondent-defendant as a witness at the domestic violence
order of protection hearing.219 However, the statute is clear in using
215. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-12(a-5) (2020) (“A petition for a
domestic violence order of protection shall be treated as an expedited
proceeding.”).
216. See, e.g., ILL. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (“A statement is not hearsay if [i]n
a criminal case, the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is inconsistent
with the declarant’s testimony at the trial or hearing, and—was made under
oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.”).
217. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/5-4.5-55(a), (d), (e) (2020) (listing the
maximum penalties for a Class A misdemeanor). The respondent-defendant will
be facing up to one year in jail, two years of probation, and a $2,500 fine as a
potential fine assuming the crime is charged as a Class A misdemeanor. The
penalties could be greater if charged as a felony.
218. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/112A-6.1(b)-(c) (2020) (listing when
criminal rules apply under the domestic violence order of protection statute).
219. See Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 77 (explaining that the Self-Incrimination
Clause prevents a criminal defendant from being called as a witness
involuntarily against himself or herself during the prosecution); Malloy, 378
U.S. at 8 (requiring that the Constitution mandates that the prosecution
establish an accused’s guilt with evidence freely and independently secured
without coercively proving a charge against him or her with evidence spoken
from him or her); How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, supra note 45 (explaining
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the word “discovery,” not “testimony,” and it is unclear in the
statute whether testimony qualifies as discovery.220 A court could
give the statute the meaning the legislature intended, and when
doing that, it will look to the language to the statute and give the
language its plain meaning.221 Therefore, a court will look to the
definitions of “discovery” and “testimony” and may determine that
“testimony” may not fall into the definition of “discovery” given the
definitions of both.222 If the statute sought to prevent the
prosecution from obtaining the respondent-defendant’s testimony
that it could use at trial, the legislature could have made that clear
by using the word “testimony” instead of or in addition to
“discovery,” and a court would then interpret the statute to reflect
the legislature’s intent and determine that the prosecution cannot
call the respondent-defendant as a witness.223 But that simply is not
how the statute reads as it stands.224
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the
respondent-defendant is not required to put forth evidence to
establish a meritorious defense and in fact may choose not to
attempt put on evidence of a meritorious defense forward once the
state has introduced prima facie evidence of a crime of domestic
that the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, through the
protection against self-incrimination, does not allow the prosecution to call the
criminal defendant as a witness and explain his or her story in a criminal
proceeding).
220. See § 5/112A-6.1(c) (emphasis added) (“Court proceedings related to the
entry of a protective order and the determination of remedies shall not be used
to obtain discovery that would not otherwise be available in a criminal
prosecution.”).
221. See Paris, 688 N.E.2d at 139 (citations omitted) (explaining that the
cardinal rule when interpreting statute is to determine the intent of the
legislature and apply that intent, the strongest evidence of the legislature’s
intent is the language in the statute, and a statute’s language must be given its
“plain and ordinary meaning”).
222. “Testimony” is defined as “[e]vidence that a competent witness under
oath or affirmation gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition.” Testimony,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “Discovery” is defined as a
“compulsory disclosure, at a party’s request, of information that relates to the
litigation” or “[t]he facts or documents disclosed.” Discovery, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
223. See Paris, 688 N.E.2d at 139 (citations omitted) (explaining that the
cardinal rule when interpreting statute is to determine the intent of the
legislature and apply that intent and the strongest evidence of the legislature’s
intent is the language in the statute).
224. See §§ 5/112A-6.1(b)-(c) (explaining when criminal rules apply under
the domestic violence order of protection statute).
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violence.225 The Court notes that this alleviates any concerns
regarding the Self-Incrimination Clause.226 However, although the
Court is correct in its analysis of the domestic violence order of
protection hearing procedure, the Court ignores that a prosecutor,
if he or she chooses to, can call the respondent-defendant to the
stand to testify given that the proceeding is deemed under the
statute a civil proceeding, thus reviving the Self-Incrimination
Clause concerns.227

C. Due Process
The domestic violence order of protection statute’s most
egregious constitutional violations are found when considering its
impacts on the right to due process, as the domestic violence order
of protection statute violates some of the most basic tenets of the
criminal justice system.228 The Illinois legislature amended the
statute after it was determined that it violated a respondentdefendant’s due process rights given that the previous version of the
statute did not allow for a hearing upon a showing of prima facie
evidence of a crime of domestic violence, but the amendment created
other serious due process concerns.229 Assuming that the
225. DeLeon, 2020 IL 124744 at ¶ 39 (noting that the domestic violence order
of protection statute’s burden-shifting provision does not require that the
respondent-defendant put forth evidence to rebut the prima facie evidence of a
crime of domestic violence and establish a meritorious defense); §§ 5/112A11.5(a)-(a-5) (“The court shall grant the petition and enter a protective order if
the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime involving domestic
violence . . . has been committed. . . . The respondent may rebut prima facie
evidence of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense. . . . If
the court finds that the evidence presented at the hearing establishes a
meritorious defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide
not to issue a protective order. ” (emphasis added)).
226. See id.
227. See § 5/112A-6.1(a) (2020) (“Any proceeding to obtain, modify, re-open,
or appeal a protective order and service of pleadings and notices shall be
governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The Code of Civil
Procedure and Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to civil
proceedings shall apply, except as otherwise provided by law.”); How Courts
Work: Steps in a Trial, supra note 45 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States, through the protection against selfincrimination, does not allow the prosecution to call the criminal defendant as
a witness and explain his or her story in a criminal proceeding).
228. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VIII (addressing the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures the right not to be subject to penalty for the
same crime twice, the right against self-incrimination, and rights in a criminal
trial).
229. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5 (Jan. 1, 2018), amended by §
5/112A-11.5 (June 29, 2018) (allowing the domestic violence order of protection
to issue simply upon a showing of prima facie evidence of a crime of domestic
violence); Brzuskiewicz, No. 17CM2444 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 16th Cir. 2018) (finding the
previous procedure to obtain a domestic violence order of protection statute
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prosecution, under the domestic violence order of protection statute,
is seeking to obtain the domestic violence order of protection on
behalf of the complaining witness in the criminal case and
introduces the criminal complaint into evidence at a hearing,230
when the statute mandates that a court enter the final domestic
violence order of protection upon a prosecutor’s showing of prima
facie evidence of a crime of domestic violence — with a prosecutor
introducing the underlying criminal complaint charging domestic
battery being sufficient enough to establish prima facie evidence —
unless the respondent-defendant establishes a meritorious defense
that rebuts the prima facie evidence and the court chooses to not
enter the domestic violence order of protection in its discretion, it
creates an impermissible and unconstitutional presumption,
namely a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden
of persuasion and the burden of production.231
unconstitutional).
230. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5.(a)(1) (2020) (“[T]he court shall
grant the petition and enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie
evidence that a crime involving domestic violence . . . has been committed. The
following shall be considered prima facie evidence of the crime: an information,
complaint, [or] indictment . . . charging a crime of domestic violence . . . .”).
231. See Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d at 788 (holding that all mandatory
presumptions are per se unconstitutional in Illinois); §§ 5/112A-11.5(a)(1), (a-5)
(explaining the procedure for a petitioner-complaining witness to obtain a
domestic violence order of protection in presenting prima facie evidence of a
crime of domestic violence and a respondent-defendant to rebut prima facie
evidence of a crime of domestic violence). A key distinction must be drawn here
with the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in People v. DeLeon. In Deleon, at
issue was the issuance of a civil no contact order, which the domestic violence
order of protection statute also allows issuance of using the same procedures as
a part of a criminal case as if one were seeking to obtain a domestic violence
order of protection under the statute as a part of a criminal case. DeLeon, 2020
IL 124744 at ¶ 3; §§ 5/112A-2.5(2)-(3); §§ 5/112A-4.5(b)-(c). The Court noted
that the trial-level court struck down 725 ILCS § 5/112A-11.5 — the section of
the domestic violence order of protection statute that requires the prosecutor or
the petitioner-complaining witness to put forth prima facie evidence of a crime
of domestic violence, including using the complaint charging domestic violence,
with the respondent-defendant then needing to put forth evidence of a
meritorious defense in order to persuade the court to not issue the final domestic
violence order of protection if the respondent-defendant does not want the final
domestic violence order of protection to issue — because it shifted the burden to
the respondent-defendant, in conflict with the Illinois Civil No Contact Order
Act’s mandate that the petitioner-complaining witness bring forth the necessary
evidence to have the no contact order issued, essentially putting the burden on
the petitioner. Id. at ¶¶4, 44. The Court noted that, although the domestic
violence order of protection statute and the Civil No Contact Order Act governed
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Taking it step-by-step, the domestic violence order of protection
statute creates a presumption because it requires the court to enter
a domestic violence order of protection upon the introduction of
prima facie evidence of a crime of domestic violence, mandating the
court to assume that a fact — that a crime of domestic violence
occurred — is in existence.232 The presumption is mandatory, as the
court is required to accept the presumption given the conditional
language in the statute and that simply introducing the criminal
complaint is enough to establish prima facie evidence; if the
complaint is introduced into evidence, prima facie evidence has been
established, and the court is required to enter the domestic violence
order of protection.233 The mandatory presumption is not conclusive
because the presumed element is not taken out of the case once the
prosecution is able to establish the predicate facts given that the
domestic violence order of protection statute does allow the
respondent-defendant to rebut the connection that exists between
the presumed and proven facts.234 Instead, the domestic violence
overlapping areas in the issuance of civil no contact order, the purpose of both
statues was clear in to provide protection to petitioners. Id. at ¶48. The Court
held there was no conflict between the two statutes, as the domestic violence
order of protection act only applies to proceedings that are a part of criminal
cases and the Civil No Contact Order Act applies to civil proceedings that are
not a part of a criminal case and where the respondent is not criminally charged,
the burden that would apply depended upon under which statute the proceeding
was brought under to cover, and the legislature created two different statutes
to cover different scenarios when petitioners may seek a civil no contact order
— those brought with prosecutions and those where there was no prosecution
ongoing as a result of a petitioner not reporting a crime or the local prosecuting
agency chose not to prosecute the crime. Id.at ¶¶48-52. Therefore, the burdenshifting scheme in the domestic violence order of protection statute was held
permissible. Id. at ¶ 52. The distinction lies in that, in DeLeon, the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the burden-shifting procedure in the domestic violence
order of protection statute when it conflicted with another statute, whereas this
Article argues that the burden-shifting procedure in the domestic violence order
of protection statute is impermissible because it conflicts with the Constitution.
232. See Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d at 787 (citing Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 320)
(explaining what a presumption is); § 5/112A-11.5(a) (“[T]he court shall grant
the petition and enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence
that a crime involving domestic violence . . . has been committed.”).
233. See Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d at 787 (citing Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 320)
(stating that a mandatory presumption mandates that the finder of fact accept
the presumption as true and explaining the two types of mandatory
presumptions); § 5/112A-11.5(a)(1) (“[T]he court shall grant the petition and
enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime
involving domestic violence . . . has been committed. The following shall be
considered prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint,
indictment, or delinquency petition, charging a crime of domestic violence.”
(emphasis added)).
234. See Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 320 (explaining that a mandatory conclusive
presumption is one that relieves the prosecution of its burden of persuasion
through “removing the presumed element from the case entirely if the State
proves the predicate facts” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
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order of protection statute shifts the burden of proof, creating a
rebuttable presumption because the respondent-defendant is
allowed to attempt to establish a meritorious defense and rebut the
prima facie evidence.235 The domestic violence order of protection
arguably shifts both the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion, the former shifting because the court must find that a
crime of domestic violence occurred if the respondent-defendant
simply does not establish a meritorious defense establishing that
fact by a preponderance of the evidence, and the latter shifting to
the respondent-defendant because once the court accepts that a
crime of domestic violence occurred after the prosecution
establishes such by prima facie evidence, the respondent-defendant
must persuade the court not to find the fact that a crime of domestic
violence occurred because of the permissive language allowing the
court to still enter the domestic violence order of protection even if
the respondent-defendant establishes a meritorious defense.236
The domestic violence order of protection statute is
unconstitutional simply because it shifts the burden of persuasion
from the prosecution to the defense; the prosecution is relieved of
its duty to prove the criminal defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.237 Indeed, the prosecutor is using the criminal complaint to
omitted)).
235. See id. (explaining mandatory rebuttable presumptions); § 5/112A11.5(a-5) (“The respondent may rebut prima facie evidence of the crime . . . by
presenting evidence of a meritorious defense.”).
236. See id. at 320-21 (explaining mandatory rebuttable presumptions and
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion). § 5/112A-11.5(a-5) (“If
the court finds that the evidence presented at the hearing establishes a
meritorious defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide
not to issue a protective order.” (emphasis added)).
237. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64 (noting that, to be found guilty of
a crime, a person must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the
“reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure,” provides a foundation for the presumption of innocence, is
necessary to “command the respect and confidence of the community in
applications of the criminal law,” so that the criminal law not be weakened to
the point that the “standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 174 (holding that,
in a criminal case, the accused must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
to prevent unjust convictions that result in “forfeitures of life, liberty, and
property”); U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1 (providing the Due Process Clauses
of the Constitution of the United States); Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d at 788 (citing
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524) (noting that the Supreme Court of the United
States has found mandatory rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of
persuasion to the criminal defendant as per se unconstitutional because they
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obtain the domestic battery order of protection against a
respondent-defendant and attempting to prove the allegations in
the criminal complaint in a criminal courtroom likely in front of the
judge who presides over the criminal case under a criminal court
number.238 Instead, the respondent-defendant is required to put
forth evidence in his or her defense that the crime charged in the
complaint did not occur and establish it by a preponderance of the
evidence simply in what may be a vain attempt to prevent the
domestic violence order of protection from entering given the
permissive language in the statute.239 Additionally, it establishes
that a criminal defendant charged with domestic battery is
presumed guilty until proven innocent instead of the other way
around, which the Constitution of the United States requires; again,
the respondent-defendant must prove that the allegations in the
complaint did not occur by a preponderance of the evidence in
putting forth its meritorious defense in an attempt to rebut the
prima facie evidence.240
The domestic violence order of protection statute is
unconstitutional under the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of Illinois because it also shifts the
burden of production.241 The domestic violence order of protection
then do not require the prosecution to prove each element of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt); Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 321 (citing Sandstrom, 442
U.S. at 524) (explaining that the Supreme Court of the United States has found
mandatory rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion as per
se unconstitutional).
238. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5.5(f) (2020) (“The request for a final
protective order can be considered at any court proceeding in the . . . criminal
case after service of the petition.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5(a) (2020)
(emphasis added) (“A petition for a protective order shall be filed in conjunction
with a . . . criminal prosecution . . . provided the petition names a victim of the
alleged crime.”); § 5/112A-11.5(a)(1) (“[T]he court shall grant the petition and
enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime
involving domestic violence . . . has been committed. The following shall be
considered prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint [or]
indictment . . . charging a crime of domestic violence.”).
239. See § 5/112A-11.5(a-5) (“The respondent may rebut prima facie evidence
of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense. . . . If the court
finds that the evidence presented at the hearing establishes a meritorious
defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide not to issue a
protective order.”).
240. See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453 (holding that the presumption of innocence
for those accused is “the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary” with the
enforcement of such providing the foundation of criminal law); § 5/112A-11.5(a5) (“The respondent may rebut prima facie evidence of the crime . . . by
presenting evidence of a meritorious defense. . . . If the court finds that the
evidence presented at the hearing establishes a meritorious defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide not to issue a protective
order.”).
241. See Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d at 788 (citing Watts, 692 N.E.2d 315 at 32223) (explaining that, in Watts, mandatory rebuttable presumptions that shift
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statute unconstitutionally requires that the respondent-defendant
present evidence that the crime of domestic violence as alleged in
the criminal complaint did not occur to overcome the presumption
and unconstitutionally requires the judge to otherwise grant a
directed verdict against the respondent-defendant if he or she does
not do so through granting the petition and entering the final
domestic violence order of protection.242
The domestic violence order of protection statute violates the
presumption of innocence and the tenet that a criminal defendant
must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under the Due
Process Clauses of the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Illinois in another sense.243 Consider the
following example: A prosecutor who is prosecuting a domestic
battery case seeks to obtain a final domestic violence order of
protection on behalf of a complaining witness against the defendant
in a criminal case.244 The criminal case has not yet gone to trial, and
the burden of production from the prosecution to the defendant were deemed
unconstitutional, making all mandatory presumptions per se unconstitutional);
see also Watts, 682 N.E.2d at 323 (holding that a mandatory presumption that
shifts the burden of production violates the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution of the United States and Due Process Clause of the State of
Illinois).
242. See Watts, 682 N.E.2d at 323-23 (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516 n.5;
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 572-73 (1977)) (holding mandatory
rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of production to a criminal
defendant unconstitutional because shifting the burden of production requires
the criminal defendant to present evidence to overcome the presumption and if
a criminal defendant fails to satisfy the burden, the judge must enter a directed
verdict against the accused that the presumption proves, contrary to the rule
that it is unconstitutional to enter a directed verdict against the accused in a
criminal case); How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, supra note 45 (explaining
that a defendant can choose not to present evidence in his or her own defense,
believing that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof).
243. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”); ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.”); Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453 (holding that the presumption of
innocence for those accused is “the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary”
with the enforcement of such providing the foundation of criminal law).
244. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-4.5(a)(2) (2020) (listing who can file
a petition for a domestic violence order of protection); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/112A-2.5(1) (2020) (“The following protective orders may be entered in
conjunction with . . . a criminal prosecution: a domestic violence order of
protection in cases of domestic violence[.]”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5(a)
(2020) (“A petition for a protective order shall be filed in conjunction with a . . .
criminal prosecution . . . provided the petition names a victim of the alleged
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the respondent-defendant has not pled guilty to the criminal
charges. The court finds prima facie evidence that a crime of
domestic battery occurred, as the complaint for the criminal
domestic battery charge is introduced into evidence.245 The
respondent-defendant seeks a hearing, but at the hearing, the
respondent-defendant is unable to establish a meritorious
defense.246 As a result, the court enters the final domestic violence
order of protection.247 The court grants as remedies in the final
domestic violence order of protection that the petitionercomplaining witness be granted exclusive possession of the
residence, the respondent-defendant stay away from the petitionercomplaining witness, and the respondent-defendant undergo
substance abuse and domestic violence counseling. Under this
scenario, in essence, the prosecution has been able to punish and
sentence the respondent-defendant using the criminal complaint
charging domestic battery without having to prove the respondentdefendant guilty at a trial beyond a reasonable doubt or without the
respondent-defendant pleading guilty to the domestic battery as
charged in the criminal complaint, a violation of the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois;
potentially innocent people are being condemned and a potential
unjust loss of life, liberty, or property is occurring.248
Permissive language in the domestic violence order of protection
statute also can lead to violations of the Due Process Clauses when
certain circumstances are present.249 Under the domestic violence
crime.” (emphasis added)).
245. See id. § 112A-11.5(a)(1) (“[T]he court shall grant the petition and enter
a protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime involving
domestic violence . . . has been committed. The following shall be considered
prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint [or] indictment . .
. charging a crime of domestic violence.”).
246. See id. § 112A-11.5(a-5) (“The respondent may rebut prima facie
evidence of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense.”).
247. See id. §§ 112A-11.5(a)(1), (a-5) (explaining the procedure for the
issuance of a domestic violence order of protection and fighting the issuance of
a domestic violence order of protection).
248. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64 (noting that, to be found guilty of
a crime, a person must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the
“reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure,” provides a foundation for the presumption of innocence, is
necessary to “command the respect and confidence of the community in
applications of the criminal law,” so that the criminal law not be weakened to
the point that the “standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 174 (holding that, in
a criminal case, the accused must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
to prevent unjust convictions that result in “forfeitures of life, liberty, and
property”). U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1 (explaining the right to due process
from the federal government and the States, respectively).
249. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”); ILL. CONST.

2021]

Using a Civil Designation as a Sword and a Shield

755

order of protection statute, if the prosecutor establishes prima facie
evidence of a crime of domestic violence through entering the
complaint charging domestic battery into evidence, the court must
grant the final domestic violence order of protection.250 Meanwhile,
if the respondent-defendant attempts to establish a meritorious
defense at a hearing and the court finds that the respondentdefendant has introduced evidence that establishes a meritorious
defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide
that it is not going to enter the final domestic violence order of
protection.251 This procedure calls into doubt whether a respondentdefendant is going to receive the “opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” he or she is entitled
to in Illinois before he or she can be deprived of life, liberty, or
property in Illinois.252 For example, after the prosecution introduces
the criminal complaint charging domestic battery, the judge at a
hearing may have already decided that, for one reason or another
— such as, for example, making sure the parties are separate and
not talking about the criminal case while it is ongoing — he or she
is going to issue the domestic violence order of protection no matter
what kind and how much evidence the respondent-defendant puts
on because the statute does not require him or her to not issue the
domestic violence order of protection if the respondent-defendant
meets his or her burden.253 Even if a judge is going to consider all of
the evidence the respondent-defendant puts forth, the respondentdefendant may always have doubt whether the evidence was in fact
considered. Although extreme, the judge could take a nap on the
bench while the respondent-defendant puts on his or her case, wake
art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.”).
250. See § 112A-11.5(a)(1) (“[T]he court shall grant the petition and enter a
protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime involving
domestic violence . . . has been committed. The following shall be considered
prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint, [or] indictment . .
. charging a crime of domestic violence.” (emphasis added)).
251. See id. § 112A-11.5(a-5) (“The respondent may rebut prima facie
evidence of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense. . . . If
the court finds that the evidence presented at the hearing establishes a
meritorious defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide
not to issue a protective order.” (emphasis added)).
252. Rucker, 127 N.E.3d at 96 (quoting In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at 484).
253. See § 5/112A-11.5(a-5) (“If the court finds that the evidence presented
at the hearing establishes a meritorious defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, the court may decide not to issue a protective order.” (emphasis
added)).
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up to grant the petition for the final domestic violence order of
protection, and find a safe haven in the statute despite the
respondent-defendant meeting his or her burden.254 The permissive
nature of the statute may also deter a respondent-defendant from
exercising his or her right to the “opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner;” if the judge may not
grant the petition for the final domestic violence order of protection
even if the respondent-defendant meets her burden, what is the
point of going to the hearing in the first place, where the
respondent-defendant may hurt himself or herself in the underlying
criminal case?255 This original section of the statute was found
unconstitutional for not providing the “opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” to the respondentdefendant, and this amendment to the statute, under some
circumstances, did not correct the constitutional violation.256
There is another set of circumstances in which the respondentdefendant is deprived of the “opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” and where the
statute certainly does not provide a remedy compared to the version
of the statute that was found unconstitutional.257 Consider the
following: A respondent-defendant is charged with the Class A
misdemeanor of domestic battery against the complaining witness
and only the complaining witness. He or she enters a plea of guilty,
and he or she is sentenced to two years of probation, $500 in fines
and costs, and to complete domestic violence counseling.258 One year
after the respondent-defendant enters the plea of guilty, under the
statute, the prosecutor of the criminal domestic battery case files a
petition for a domestic violence order of protection on behalf of the
254. See id. (“If the court finds that the evidence presented at the hearing
establishes a meritorious defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
may decide not to issue a protective order.” (emphasis added)).
255. Rucker, 127 N.E.3d at 96 (quoting In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at 484); supra
§ II.B.
256. Rucker, 127 N.E.3d at 96 (quoting In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at 484); see
also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5 (Jan. 1, 2018), amended by § 5/112A11.5 (June 29, 2018) (allowing the domestic violence order of protection to issue
simply upon a showing of prima facie evidence of a crime of domestic violence);
Brzuskiewicz, No. 17CM2444 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 16th Cir. 2018) (finding the previous
procedure to obtain a domestic violence order of protection statute
unconstitutional).
257. Rucker, 127 N.E.3d at 96 (quoting In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at 484).
258. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/5-4.5-55(a), (d), (e) (2020) (listing the
maximum penalties for a Class A misdemeanor); Holman, 20 N.E.3d at 463
(noting that the defendant had previously been convicted of domestic battery
and was ordered to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and domestic
violence counseling); Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d at 846 (noting that the defendant was
sentenced to complete domestic violence counseling as part of a sentence for
domestic battery); Illinois Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 113 (discussing
how domestic violence counseling may be a part of a sentence for domestic
battery).
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complaining witness against the respondent-defendant.259 The
prosecutor uses the criminal complaint charging the domestic
battery the respondent-defendant pled guilty to and the plea of
guilty itself to establish prima facie evidence of the crime.260 The
respondent-defendant attempts to rebut the prima facie evidence of
the crime through presenting a meritorious defense, but the judge
at the hearing finds that the respondent-defendant failed to meet
his or her burden, and the judge enters the final domestic violence
order of protection.261 In terms of remedies, the petition only sought,
and the judge only granted, that the petitioner-complaining witness
have exclusive possession of the residence, the prohibition of the
respondent-defendant from entering or remaining at that residence,
and that the respondent-defendant stay away from the petitionercomplaining witness.262 As for the duration of the final domestic
violence order of protection, the judge orders that the final domestic
violence order of protection remain in effect until two years after the
end of the respondent-defendant’s term of probation.263 Three
months later, the respondent-defendant allegedly intentionally

259. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-4.5(a)(2) (2020) (listing who can file
a petition for a domestic violence order of protection); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/112A-2.5(1) (2020) (“The following protective orders may be entered in
conjunction with . . . a criminal prosecution: a domestic violence order of
protection in cases of domestic violence[.]”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5.5(a)
(2020) (“A petition for a protective order may be filed at any time after a criminal
charge . . . is filed and before the charge . . . is dismissed, the defendant . . . is
acquitted, or the defendant . . . completes service of his or her sentence.”).
260. See id. §§ 112A-11.5(a)(1)-(2) (“[T]he court shall grant the petition and
enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie evidence that a crime
involving domestic violence . . . has been committed. The following shall be
considered prima facie evidence of the crime: an information, complaint, [or]
indictment charging a crime of domestic violence . . . ; a finding of guilt based
upon a plea.”).
261. See §§ 5/112A-11.5 (a-5) (“The respondent may rebut prima facie
evidence of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense.”).
262. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/112A-14(b)(2)-(3) (2020) (listing as
permissible remedies as a part of a domestic violence order of protection as
exclusive possession of the residence for the petitioner-complaining witness, the
prohibition of the respondent-defendant from entering or remaining of the
premises of the residence, and that the respondent-defendant must stay away
from the petitioner-complaining witness).
263. See id. § 112A-20(b)(3) (“A final protective order shall remain in effect
as follows: until 2 years after the expiration of any supervision, conditional
discharge, probation, periodic imprisonment, parole, aftercare release, or
mandatory supervised release for domestic violence orders of protection and
civil no contact orders.”).
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damages the car of the complaining witness’s brother. The
respondent-defendant faces charges for damaging the car. The
respondent-defendant has never lived with the complaining
witness’s brother, nor is he otherwise considered a family or
household member under the domestic violence order of protection
statute.264 The prosecutor now seeks to modify the final domestic
violence order of protection and wants to include as a remedy that
the respondent-defendant must stay away from the petitionercomplaining witness’s brother, as the statute allows for such given
that the prosecutor seeks a remedy that was not requested to be
included in the original domestic violence order of protection and a
permissible remedy is to stay away from any person who is a
protected person.265 More than thirty days have elapsed since the
original domestic violence order of protection was entered, but there
has been a change in the applicable facts that the court determines
warrant a modification given that that the respondent-defendant
allegedly damaged the car of the complaining witness’s brother.266
This scenario presents an issue at each stage. Starting with the
original final domestic violence order of protection, the respondentdefendant would be hard pressed to believe that he or she had the
“opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.”267 Given that the respondent-defendant already pled
guilty to domestic battery, prima facie evidence of a crime of
domestic battery has been established.268 Because the respondentdefendant admitted to the crime and was found guilty, it is highly
likely that the judge would enter the domestic violence order of
protection and find that the respondent-defendant did not meet his
or her burden through presenting a meritorious defense, as was the
264. See id. § 112A-3(b)(3) (“’Family or household members’ include spouses,
former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren, and other persons related by
blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who share or formerly shared a
common dwelling, persons who have or allegedly have a child in common,
persons who share or allegedly share a blood relationship through a child,
persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship, persons
with disabilities and their personal assistants, and caregivers.”).
265. See id. § 112A-24(a)(2)(ii) (2020) (“[U]pon motion by . . . the State’s
Attorney on behalf of the petitioner, the court may modify a protective order: . .
. by adding any remedy authorized by Section 112A-14 . . . which was not
requested for inclusion in that protective order.”); § 5/112A-14(b)(3) (“The court
may order . . . respondent to stay away from petitioner or any other person
protected by the domestic violence order of protection.”).
266. See id. § 112A-24(c) (“After 30 days following the entry of a protective
order, a court may modify that order only when changes in the applicable law
or facts since that final order was entered warrant a modification of its terms.”).
267. Rucker, 127 N.E.3d at 96 (quoting In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at 484).
268. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5(a)(2) (2020) (“[T]he court shall
grant the petition and enter a protective order if the court finds prima facie
evidence that a crime involving domestic violence . . . has been committed. The
following shall be considered prima facie evidence of the crime: . . . a finding of
guilt based upon a plea.”).
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case in this scenario.269 Therefore, any hearing is not likely to be
meaningful, as the result will already be written in stone. As a
result, the Constitution of the State of Illinois and the Constitution
of the United States are violated.270
A more egregious issue arises with the attempt to modify the
final domestic violence order of protection. The statute does not
necessarily require a hearing before the modified remedies are put
into place, either. The modification section of the statute makes no
mention of a hearing before modified remedies are put into place,
and the section of the statute that discusses hearings makes no
mention of a hearing for modification of a domestic violence order of
protection and seems only to be concerned with the initial issuance
of a domestic violence order of protection, especially given the title
of the section, “Issuance of protective order.”271 As a result, the
prosecutor in this scenario can argue that a hearing is not necessary
for a modification, and therefore, if a judge agrees, the respondentdefendant would be deprived of his or her liberty in that he or she
will not be able to have contact with the complaining witness’s
brother despite not having the “opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” regarding the
allegations and remedies, again, the very reason the original
version of the statute was found unconstitutional in the first
place.272

269. See id. § 112A-11.5(a-5) (“The respondent may rebut prima facie
evidence of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense. . . . If
the court finds that the evidence presented at the hearing establishes a
meritorious defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may decide
not to issue a protective order.”).
270. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”); ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.”); Rucker, 127 N.E.3d at 96 (quoting In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at
448) (noting that the right to due process includes the right to “the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”).
271. See § 5/112A-24 (discussing the procedure for when and how to modify
a domestic violence order of protection); § 5/112A-11.5 (discussing the
procedures for the issuance of a domestic violence order of protection).
272. Rucker, 127 N.E.3d at 96 (quoting In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at 448); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-11.5 (Jan. 1, 2018), amended by § 5/112A-11.5 (June
29, 2018) (allowing the domestic violence order of protection to issue simply
upon a showing of prima facie evidence of a crime of domestic violence);
Brzuskiewicz, No. 17CM2444 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 16th Cir. 2018) (finding the previous
procedure to obtain a domestic violence order of protection statute
unconstitutional).
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Furthermore, if there is a hearing, it is not likely to be the
meaningful hearing constitutionally required.273 The prosecution
used the criminal plea of guilty to domestic battery and the criminal
complaint alleging domestic battery against the complaining
witness and only the complaining witness — and not the
complaining witness’s brother — to obtain the original domestic
violence order of protection. Damaging the complaining witness’s
car is not a crime of domestic violence, nor is the brother a family or
household member.274 As a result, the complaining witness or a
prosecutor cannot obtain a domestic violence order of protection
under the case that charges a crime for the damage to the car.275 So,
they sought the modification of the domestic violence order of
protection that was issued in conjunction with the criminal case
that features a crime of domestic violence. The brother has nothing
to do with the criminal domestic battery case or the allegations. Yet,
the prosecution seeks to protect him, as the statute permits.276 The
prosecution could use the plea of guilty to the criminal domestic
battery charge to establish prima facie evidence of a crime of
domestic battery to obtain the modification, which, again, that case
has nothing to do with the brother, and if the respondent-defendant
wishes to challenge the modification, he or she would have to
provide a meritorious defense to rebut the prima facie evidence of a
crime of domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence
assuming he or she is entitled to the hearing in the first place under
the statute.277 At this point in the proceedings, the same due process
issues already discussed, including the improper burden-shifting
and the issue with the permissive language of the statute, would
273. See Rucker, 127 N.E.3d at 96 (quoting In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d at 448)
(noting that the right to due process includes the right to “the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”).
274. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-3(b)(3) (2020) (“’Family or household
members’ include spouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren, and
other persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who
share or formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who have or allegedly
have a child in common, persons who share or allegedly share a blood
relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a dating or
engagement relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal
assistants, and caregivers.”).
275. See id. § 112A-4.5(a) (listing who can file a petition for a domestic
violence order of protection); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-2.5(1) (2020) (“The
following protective orders may be entered in conjunction with a . . . criminal
prosecution: a domestic violence order of protection in cases involving domestic
violence[.]”).
276. See id. § 112A-14(b)(3) (allowing a domestic violence order of protection
to have a remedy that the respondent-defendant stay away from any person).
277. See id. §§ 112A-11.5(a)(2), (a-5) (describing the procedure for obtaining
a domestic violence order of protection and the respondent-defendant’s only
recourse—proving a meritorious defense—to prevent the domestic violence
order of protection from issuing once prima facie evidence of a crime of domestic
violence is established).
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arise once more.
It makes no sense to challenge whether the complaining
witness’s brother needs an order of protection against the
respondent-defendant for what the respondent-defendant allegedly
did to the brother’s car by trying to establish that a crime of
domestic battery did not occur against the complaining witness, as
the statute could potentially require.278 If the complaining witness’s
brother really needs an order of protection, he could obtain one
using civil processes. The purposes of the statute, to keep
complaining witnesses and their families safe and to keep the
trauma and inconvenience of attending multiple and different civil
court proceedings to get an order of protection to a minimum, do not
even apply to the brother given that he was not involved in the
domestic battery case.279 However, the domestic violence order of
protection statute allows the prosecution to take advantage of the
domestic battery criminal case and protect those who need
protection through an order of protection, though not through a
domestic violence order of protection, let alone those who do not
need protection at all.
The domestic violence order of protection statute allows
prosecutors to violate the Constitution of the State of Illinois in
many ways, from the Self-Incrimination Clauses to the Double
Jeopardy Clauses to the Due Process Clauses simply from the
designation that the domestic violence order of protection
proceedings are civil proceedings.280 Although some constitutional
violations occur only when certain circumstances arise,281 others

278. See id. § 112A-11.5(a-5) (“The respondent may rebut prima facie
evidence of the crime . . . by presenting evidence of a meritorious defense.”).
279. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-1.5 (2020) (explaining the purpose of
the domestic violence order of protection statute).
280. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (explaining the prohibition against
double jeopardy, that a witness cannot be compelled to be a witness against
himself, and the right to due process); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-6.1(a)
(2020) (“Any proceeding to obtain, modify, re-open, or appeal a protective order
and service of pleadings and notices shall be governed by the rules of civil
procedure of this State. The Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court and
local court rules applicable to civil proceedings shall apply, except as otherwise
provided by law.”).
281. See, e.g., supra Section II.C (providing an example that the Constitution
of the United Stated and Constitution of the State of Illinois are violated if a
judge has his or her mind made up that he or she is going to enter the domestic
violence order of protection before a hearing even commences given the
permissive language in the statute).
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arise in all cases.282 The Illinois legislature wants the domestic
violence order of protection statute to be interpreted in favor of a
victim’s constitutional rights under the Constitution of the State of
Illinois, including the right to be treated fairly and with respect for
his or her privacy and dignity and to not be intimidated, harassed,
and abused as the case moves through the criminal justice
system.283 However, when doing such, it is the respondentdefendants — the ones charged with the crime of domestic battery
and who are also entitled to constitutional rights under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State
of Illinois — who are unacceptably intimidated, harassed, and
abused as the case moves through the criminal justice system.284 If
a court grants a final domestic violence order of protection and the
procedure leading up to the entry or the entry itself violates the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State
of Illinois, given that there is a final judgment as a result of a court’s
decision that terminates the litigation on the issue of whether to
issue a domestic violence order of protection, the respondentdefendant can appeal the entry of the domestic violence order of
protection pursuant to his or her right to appeal under the
Constitution of the State of Illinois regardless of whether the
respondent-defendant is recognized as a civil litigant or a criminal
litigant.285 However, what if the respondent-defendant cannot
afford to appeal the entry of the domestic violence order of
protection?

282. See, e.g., supra Section II.C (discussing how the burden shifting violates
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of
Illinois); supra Section II.A (explaining that allowing prosecutors to use a
criminal complaint to obtain a domestic violence order of protection for a
complaining witness in a domestic battery case violates the Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
State of Illinois).
283. See § 5/112A-1.5 (“This Article shall be interpreted in accordance with
the Constitutional rights of crime victims set forth in Article I, Section 8.1 of the
Illinois Constitution.”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (describing the constitutional
rights of crime victims).
284. See id. § 112A-1.5 (describing the purpose of the domestic violence order
of protection statute).
285. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit
Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial District in
which the Circuit Court is located except in cases appealable directly to the
Supreme Court and except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case,
there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal.”); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 301
(“Every final judgment of a Circuit Court in a civil case is appealable as of
right.”); Final-Judgment Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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IV. THE ISSUE OF CHALLENGING THE DOMESTIC BATTERY
ORDER OF PROTECTION STATUTORY FRAMEWORK ON
APPEAL
The courts must recognize the proceedings as criminal and hold
the Illinois legislature in check pursuant to its role in the system of
checks and balances in declaring several sections of the domestic
violence order of protection statutory scheme unconstitutional.286
However, there are potential roadblocks to a constitutional
challenge of the domestic violence order of protection statute. One
such roadblock is the indigency of the respondent-defendant.
A person who is charged with domestic battery in Illinois is
entitled to counsel.287 Given that there is a right to appeal in Illinois,
if a criminal defendant is found guilty of domestic battery and he or
she wishes to appeal an issue that arose during the course of the
criminal case, he or she would be entitled to counsel on appeal.288 If
the criminal defendant is indigent, the State Appellate Defender’s
Office would be appointed to represent the criminal defendant on
appeal.289 However, the State Appellate Defender’s Office will not
represent someone who is indigent and who seeks to challenge the

286. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-80 (holding that laws contrary to the
Constitution of the United States are void, the judiciary determines what the
law says, the judicial power of federal courts extends to cases that arise under
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the United States
binds courts in making decisions).
287. See generally Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (requiring that indigent criminal
defendants be provided trial counsel); Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding
that a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel if he or she is going to be
imprisoned even for one day); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-3.2(b) (2020)
(“Domestic Battery is a Class A Misdemeanor.”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/54.5-55(a), (d), (e) (2020) (listing the penalties for Class A misdemeanors,
including up to one year in jail).
288. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357 (holding that when the merits of an appeal
are determined without counsel, “an unconstitutional distinction exists between
the rich and the poor); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“Appeals from final judgments of
a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial
District in which the Circuit Court is located except in cases appealable directly
to the Supreme Court and except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal
case, there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal.”).
289. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/10 (2020) (emphasis added) (“The State
Appellate Defender shall represent indigent persons on appeal in criminal and
delinquent minor proceedings.”); About Us, supra note 103 (noting that the
Office of the State Appellate Defender “represent[s] indigent persons on appeal
in criminal cases”).
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entry of or the procedure leading up to the entry of the domestic
violence order of protection — including challenging the civil
designation that provides a shield to let prosecutors violate his or
her constitutional rights in what truly is a criminal proceeding
given the basis for the domestic violence order of protection is the
criminal complaint charging domestic battery and the proceedings
take place in a criminal courtroom in front of the judge presiding
over the criminal case with the prosecutor presenting the same
evidence he or she would to obtain a guilty verdict at a trial —
simply because the legislature has designated the domestic violence
order of protection proceedings as civil proceedings.290 Thus, an
indigent respondent-defendant finds himself or herself in a
proverbial catch twenty-two: the indigent respondent-defendant
wants to challenge the civil designation that allows prosecutors to
violate his or her rights but cannot do so because of that very civil
designation.
What this means in practice is that there will be fewer
respondent-defendants who challenge the statutory framework
given that some of them will be unable to do so as a result of a cost
barrier. The lack of resources will in effect deny the indigent
respondent-defendant of an opportunity to appeal because few will
try, and if they do, they will likely be unsuccessful given they are
not experienced and trained lawyers;291 the appellate court will
likely affirm the entry of the domestic violence order of protection,
which will serve as a ringing endorsement of the violation of
constitutional rights with the civil designation providing the shield
to do so. Only those who can afford to hire experienced and trained
attorneys on appeal will likely challenge the constitutionality of the
statutory framework if they so choose and have a better chance of

290. See id. § 112A-6.1(a) (“Any proceeding to obtain, modify, re-open, or
appeal a protective order and service of pleadings and notices shall be governed
by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The Code of Civil Procedure and
Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to civil proceedings shall apply,
except as otherwise provided by law.”); § 105/3 (“The State Appellate Defender
shall represent indigent persons on appeal in criminal and delinquent minor
proceedings.” (emphasis added)).
291. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355-56, 358 (noting how the practice at issue
the type of appeal a criminal defendant received depended on whether or not he
or she could pay counsel, and if he or she could the appellate court made a ruling
on the merits of the case after the benefit of a written brief and counsel’s oral
argument, and if he or she could not pay for counsel, the appellate court, under
the practice, is required to prejudge the merits of the case prior to it determining
whether counsel is to be provided, with only the barren record providing
assistance to the indigent at this point and forcing the indigent to go forward
without counsel unless the record shows a patent injustice, creating a situation
where if someone is indigent, “where the record is unclear or the errors are
hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a
meaningful appeal.”).
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success.292 In turn, it means that it is less likely that an appellate
court will deem the statutory framework unconstitutional. The end
result is that more people will potentially find themselves subject to
a domestic violence order of protection and can potentially have
prosecutors take advantage of them to benefit the government in
the criminal case and violate their constitutional rights. Such a
result is purely asinine, and as a society, it cannot be tolerated. With
the criminal complaint serving as the basis for obtaining a domestic
violence order of protection and with a prosecutor seeking to obtain
the domestic violence order of protection on behalf of a complaining
witness in the criminal domestic battery case presenting evidence
that would be introduced in a criminal domestic battery trial in
front of the very judge who presides over the criminal case in the
criminal courtroom under the criminal case number, the proceeding
is criminal, and the respondent-defendant should be entitled to
counsel on appeal.293
Not to mention that effectively denying the indigent the
opportunity to appeal the statutory framework because they are
indigent while those who can afford counsel to appeal the entry of
or the process leading up to the entry of the domestic violence order
of protection can more effectively appeal the entry or the process
creates due process and equal protection concerns under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State
of Illinois.294 Denying counsel to the indigent to appeal the
constitutionality of the statutory framework while those who can
afford attorneys can more effectively challenge the statutory
framework is akin to denying the defendants in Griffin free
transcripts.295 As the Griffin Court stated, the concepts of due
292. See id. at 358 (theorizing that, when the record has no clear errors or
hidden errors, the indigent criminal defendant only “has the right to a
meaningful ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal”).
293. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5(a) (2020) (emphasis added) (“A
petition for a protective order shall be filed in conjunction with a . . . criminal
prosecution, provided the petition names a victim of the alleged crime.”); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5.5(f) (2020) (“The request for a final protective order
can be considered at any court proceeding in the . . . criminal case after service
of the petition.”).
294. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); ILL CONST. art.
I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.”).
295. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13-14 (explaining how the petitioners, alleging that
they were poor and could not pay the fees to acquire the transcript and court
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process and equal protection require that there be no discrimination
between defendants; everyone is equal before the bench in every
court.296 As the Griffin Court explained, it violates the Equal
Protection Clauses for a court to use poverty as a basis to
discriminate, just like it violates the Equal Protection Clauses for
courts to discriminate on the basis of race or religion.297 A person’s
inability to pay cannot be a basis to deny someone access to justice,
especially when someone’s constitutional rights are at stake, like
they are with domestic violence orders of protection statutory
framework.298 A state that allows appeals as of right, like Illinois
does,299 cannot permit a system to exist that discriminates against
a person simply because he or she is indigent given that appellate
review is an essential component of the justice system.300 “[T]here
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has.” 301 As a result, those who seek to
challenge the domestic violence order of protection statutory
framework must be given the opportunity to have the same and
adequate appellate review process that someone who seeks to
challenge the statutory framework but who is not indigent has.302
Designating the domestic violence order of protection proceedings
as civil, which in effect denies the indigent respondent-defendant
counsel on appeal, violates these tenets and premises of Griffin.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Douglas has already

records for appellate purpose, were convicted of armed robbery after being tried
together, thereafter filing a motion asking for a certified copy of the records be
provided for free, with only those who were indigent and sentenced to death
given free transcripts with all other defendants required to purchase it).
296. See id. at 17 (quoting Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241) (explaining that the
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the
United States require procedures in criminal trials that do not discriminate
between people and different types of people, with all “stand[ing] on equality
before the bar of justice in every American court”).
297. See id. holding that it is just as impermissible for a court to discriminate
on the basis of poverty compared to religion, race, or color).
298. See id. at 17-18. (holding that the inability to pay cannot be used to
deprive a criminal defendant of a fair trial).
299. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit
Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial District in
which the Circuit Court is located except in cases appealable directly to the
Supreme Court and except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case,
there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal.”).
300. See Griffin, 352 U.S. at 18 (citations omitted) (explaining that even
though a State is not constitutionally mandated to create appellate courts or
provide a right to appeal, when a state goes grant appellate review, it cannot
discriminate against a convicted a criminal defendant on the basis of his or her
poverty, especially when appellate review is an important part of the criminal
just system in Illinois).
301. Id. at 19.
302. See id. (requiring that indigent criminal defendants be afforded the
same appellate process as those who can afford to buy transcripts).
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found that denying counsel to those who are indigent is the type of
improper discrimination that Griffin sought to prohibit.303 As a
result, a person who is indigent is entitled to counsel when he or she
has a right to appeal like he or she has in Illinois.304 If a person can
afford an attorney to challenge the domestic violence order of
protection statutory framework, such a person will have the benefit
of the appellate court deciding the merits of the appeal after his or
her lawyer filed a brief and made an oral argument.305 Meanwhile,
an indigent person who cannot afford counsel and who is not given
counsel would not receive such benefits, and the appellate court
would only decide the merits of the appeal and determine whether
the statutory framework violates the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois on the basis of
what the record contained at the trial court level.306 If there is
hidden merit in challenging the statutory framework, or if the
record at the trial court level is not clear, the indigent respondentdefendant would have a meaningless ritual, and the respondentdefendant who could afford counsel would have a meaningful
appeal.307 Simply put, an unconstitutional distinction exists when
303. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355 (holding that denying counsel to an
indigent criminal defendant on appeal would be equal to the invidious
discrimination the Supreme Court of the United States sought to combat in
Griffin v. Illinois, where it was held that a State could not grant and deny
appellate review in a manner that discriminates on the basis of poverty).
304. See id. at 357 (holding that when the merits of an appeal are
determined without counsel, an unconstitutional distinction exists between the
rich and the poor); see also ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“Appeals from final
judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the
Judicial District in which the Circuit Court is located except in cases appealable
directly to the Supreme Court and except that after a trial on the merits in a
criminal case, there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal.”).
305. See Douglas, 472 U.S. at 355-56 (noting how the practice at issue the
type of appeal a criminal defendant received depended on whether or not he or
she could pay counsel, and if he or she could the appellate court made a ruling
on the merits of the case after the benefit of a written brief and counsel’s oral
argument).
306. See id. at 356 (explaining how if a criminal defendant could not pay for
counsel, the appellate court, under the practice, is required to prejudge the
merits of the case prior to it determining whether counsel is to be provided, with
only the barren record providing assistance to the indigent at this point and
forcing the indigent to go forward without counsel unless the record shows a
patent injustice).
307. See id. at 358 (theorizing that, when the record has no clear errors or
hidden errors, the indigent criminal defendant only “has the right to a
meaningful ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal”).
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the merits of an appeal for an indigent respondent-defendant who
is seeking to challenge the domestic violence order of protection
statutory framework are determined without the respondentdefendant having the benefit of counsel.308
Sure, the Douglas and Griffin courts may have ruled the way
they did because in criminal cases the consequences can be
severe.309 However, consequences can also be severe when
constitutional rights are violated — as the domestic violence order
of protection statute does and enables prosecutors to do — and it is
unacceptable to allow basic tenets of the Constitution of the United
States and Constitution of the State of Illinois to be violated simply
because someone cannot afford counsel.310 Regardless, a criminal
versus civil distinction cannot be an acceptable justification for
discriminating on the basis of poverty and denying access to the
courts; to do so would deprive meaning to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of the State of Illinois.311 Furthermore, the domestic violence order
of protection proceedings are truly criminal despite the civil
designation.312 The bottom line is the Illinois legislature has done
indigent respondent-defendants and society as a whole a disservice
as a result of indigent respondent-defendants being denied counsel
to appeal the domestic violence order of protection statutory
framework on constitutional grounds given that the domestic

308. See id. at 357 (holding that when the merits of an indigent criminal
defendant’s appeal are decided without counsel, an unconstitutional distinction
exists between the rich and the poor).
309. See, e.g., Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 (quoting Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241
(explaining that the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution of the United States require procedures in criminal trials that do
not discriminate between people and different types of people, with all
“stand[ing] on equality before the bar of justice in every American court”).
310. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VIII addressing the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures the right not to be subject to penalty for the
same crime twice, the right against self-incrimination, and rights in a criminal
trial).
311. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); ILL CONST. art.
I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.”).
312. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-6.1(a) (2020) (“Any proceeding to
obtain, modify, re-open, or appeal a protective order and service of pleadings
and notices shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The
Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to
civil proceedings shall apply, except as otherwise provided by law.”); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-5(a) (2020) (emphasis added) (“A petition for a protective
order shall be filed in conjunction with a . . . criminal prosecution, provided the
petition names a victim of the alleged crime.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A5.5(f) (2020) (“The request for a final protective order can be considered at any
court proceeding in the . . . criminal case after service of the petition.”).
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violence order of protection proceedings are designated as civil
proceedings.313

V. CONCLUSION
The domestic violence order of protection statutory framework —
specifically, the designation that the domestic violence order of
protection proceedings are civil proceedings — provides an
unacceptable sword and shield for prosecutors who are seeking to
obtain the domestic violence order of protection on behalf of the
complaining witness in a criminal domestic battery case and are
also prosecuting the criminal domestic battery case to use in
obtaining a domestic violence order of protection.314 It serves as a
sword in the first place in the simple sense that the prosecution can
use the statute to obtain the domestic violence order of protection.315
However, the statute serves as a shield because it allows the
prosecution to violate the constitutional rights of respondentdefendants and unfairly take advantage of them in ways that do not
necessarily violate their constitutional rights when seeking to
obtain the domestic violence order of protection when the
prosecution would not be able to do so in the criminal domestic
battery case itself.316 This in turn provides another sword, as the
prosecution can take advantage of the respondent-defendant to
313. See id. § 112A-6.1(a) (“Any proceeding to obtain, modify, re-open, or
appeal a protective order and service of pleadings and notices shall be governed
by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The Code of Civil Procedure and
Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to civil proceedings shall apply,
except as otherwise provided by law.”).
314. See id. (“Any proceeding to obtain, modify, re-open, or appeal a
protective order and service of pleadings and notices shall be governed by the
rules of civil procedure of this State. The Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme
Court and local court rules applicable to civil proceedings shall apply, except as
otherwise provided by law.”). Again, the purpose of this Article is not to rail
against prosecutors. They are doing their jobs and doing what the domestic
violence order of protection statute allows them to do. The real gripe is with the
legislature that put this statutory framework into law in the first place.
315. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/112A-4.5(a)(2)-(3) (2020) (stating that
prosecutors can file a petition for a domestic violence order of protection on
behalf of a complaining witness in a criminal domestic battery case under
certain circumstances).
316. See supra Part III (exploring the many ways the domestic violence order
of protection statute violates the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Illinois and allows prosecutors to take advantage of
respondent-defendants).
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potentially damn him or her in the underlying criminal domestic
battery case.317 Perhaps the most alarming shield is that, as a result
of the domestic violence order of protection proceedings being
deemed civil proceedings, indigent respondent-defendants are
unlikely to appeal an entry of a domestic violence order of
protection, making it less likely that the statutory framework is
held unconstitutional and ensuring that the framework remains in
place, which is unconstitutional in and of itself.318
What changes can be made to the domestic violence order of
protection statutory framework to ensure that the constitutional
rights of respondent-defendants are respected while achieving the
purposes of the statute in keeping victims of domestic violence and
their families safe and keeping the trauma and inconvenience of
going to multiple and separate civil court proceedings to obtain an
order of protection at a minimum?319 Although some changes can be
made to strike a fair balance between the two interests, like not
allowing the prosecution to argue for a negative inference if the
respondent-defendant invokes the Self-Incrimination Clauses of the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State
of Illinois in choosing not testify at a domestic violence order of
protection hearing or after the prosecution calls him or her to the
stand,320 in some areas where the domestic violence order of
protection statute violates the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of Illinois, it may not be possible to
obtain a fair balance between the two interests.321 It is up to the
317. See supra Section II.B (discussing how an overzealous prosecutor can
force a respondent-defendant into choosing whether or not to exercise his or her
constitutional right against self-incrimination, and if the respondent-defendant
chooses not to exercise the right, the prosecutor can use the testimony obtained
from the respondent-defendant at the domestic violence order of protection
hearing against the respondent-defendant at trial or corner him or her into a
defense if discovery is incomplete at the time of the hearing).
318. See § 5/112A-6.1(a) (“Any proceeding to obtain, modify, re-open, or
appeal a protective order and service of pleadings and notices shall be governed
by the rules of civil procedure of this State. The Code of Civil Procedure and
Supreme Court and local court rules applicable to civil proceedings shall apply,
except as otherwise provided by law.”); supra Part IV (exploring how it is
unconstitutionally difficult for an indigent respondent-defendant to appeal the
entry of a domestic violence order of protection or the statutory framework
allowing for the issuance of the domestic violence order of protection).
319. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/112A-1.5 (2020) (“The purpose of this
Article is to protect the safety of victims of domestic violence . . . and the safety
of their family and household members; and to minimize the trauma and
inconvenience associated with attending separate and multiple civil court
proceedings to obtain protective orders.”).
320. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person shall
be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself.”); supra Part
III.B.
321. See, e.g., supra Part III.C (discussing the impermissible presumptions
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Illinois Legislature to find the fair balance. One thing is for sure,
however: The balance in the domestic violence order of protection
statutory framework is impermissibly too one sided against
respondent-defendants and their constitutional rights as it stands
now.

and burden shifting the domestic violence order of protection statute creates).
Allowing the prosecution or a complaining witness to present the criminal
complaint to establish prima facie evidence of a crime of domestic battery, with
at that point the respondent-defendant needing to present evidence of a
meritorious defense to potentially avoid the domestic violence order of
protection from entering, clearly meets the goals of the statute but clearly
creates unconstitutional presumptions and burden shifting. See 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. §§ 5/112A-11.5(a)(1), (a-5) (2020) (describing the procedure for a
petitioner-complaining witness to obtain a domestic violence order of protection
and for a respondent-defendant to try and prevent its issuance); supra Part III.C
(describing the due process violations, including unconstitutional burden
shifting, the domestic violence order of protection statute endorses). However,
if the unconstitutional presumptions and burden shifting are removed, it would
make it more difficult to protect victims of domestic violence and their families
and would make it more inconvenient and tenuous for victims of domestic
violence to obtain an order of protection. See § 5/112A-1.5 (describing the
purposes of the domestic violence order of protection statute).

772

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

